Owen—Interrogative Thought—Means of Its Expression. 455 
true (or else as ■untrue), you need this thought to furnish you 
that influence. Therefore I bring in this thought. In the 
chosen illustration, my interrogative mental structure becomes 
accordingly, as thus far developed, what may be expressed by 
“your belief-or-disbelief in the truth of Brown’s being honest.” 
This belief-or-disbelief I obviously wish you to tell me. This 
wish accordingly I also bring in, completing my interrogative 
mental structure, which may be expressed by “I wish you to tell 
me your belief-or-disbelief in the truth of Brown’s being honest” 
—or, more conveniently to further argument, by “I wish you 
to tell me your believing-or-disbelieving the truth of Brown to 
be honest,”* 
This expression I propose as exhibiting my thought in a form 
which it may assume, unbiased by the exigencies of adopted lin¬ 
guistic methods. Such thought, however, is apparently some¬ 
what modified, before a sentence is attempted. I do not mean 
that modification is necessary; for no doubt that expression, 
though offered merely as a broad description of my mental state, 
is also quite available as it stands, for practical linguistic pur¬ 
poses. It suffers, however, from undue length. Condensation 
is to be expected. In preparation for the condensation actually 
reached by the interrogative sentence, modification seems to me 
to occur as follows: 
In the first place, a judgment is substituted for the mere con¬ 
ception indicated by “believing-or-disbelieving, etc,” As previ¬ 
ously argued, the current judgment-forms of speech are highly 
condensed—more so, I think, than any others. To remodel con¬ 
ception into judgment, promises then the best of chances to 
condense. 
The judgment contemplated is your own, not mine. But 
*It is plain that I might resort to the expedient of analyzing yonr 
indefinite mental action (believing-or-disbelieving) into a comparatively 
definite doing of something indefinite. I might by this means change 
my interrogative judgment into the form expressible by “I wish you to 
tell me something (i. e. that which = what) you think of the truth, 
etc.” This judgment I might express by “What do you think, etc,?” 
Similar analysed would enable me ito utilize other interrogative words 
examined in Chap. III. For instance, interrogative ends would be met 
by “What opinion have you, etc.?” or “How do regard, etc.?' Enough, 
however, that I may and often do elect the special form of interrogative 
judgment indicated just above. 
