456 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters . 
I can not form the judgments of other people—only my own.* 
But, again, in the present case I cannot form a judgment of my 
own. That is, I cannot really believe, or disbelieve. In this 
strait, I resort to a linguistic fiction. Though in fact I neither 
believe nor disbelieve, I put it that I either believe or disbelieve. 
This presentation, though strictly false, is practically harmless, 
as it does not favor any particular untrue thought, I am more¬ 
over naturally disposed to make it, as it merely looks beyond 
my actual indecision, to decision which, by your aid, I expect to 
reach. I offer then, as mine, what is already mine in wish, and 
is expected in a moment to be really mine. Moreover I am not 
in any danger of deceiving you. It is plain to you that I am 
merely putting myself in your place—merely making for you 
a show of that judging which you will really achieve. Without 
haggling over the “I,” you put yourself in my place—that is, 
you substitute yourself for me as judgment-former—the “I,” 
which stood for me, now symbolizing you. That is, as indi¬ 
cated once before (p. 452), we sink the difference between 
“meum and tuum.” 
Developing now a little the argument of p. 449, I note that 
the use of an indefinite “believe-or-disbelieve” may seem less 
implausible!, if it be remembered that, after all, it is quite 
analogous to what. was. done in leading up to recognizedly inter¬ 
rogative words (p. 430). When I formed the imperfect judg¬ 
ment u .killed Lincoln”—imperfect through the absence 
of a primary judgment-term—I provisionally filled the void 
with an indefinite “some one.” So also now 7 1 fill the void created 
*1 could form indeed a judgment to the effect that you have formed 
(are forming or will form) a judgment—that is, I could form a belief 
that you believe a thought to be true; and such a judgment I could ex¬ 
press by a sentence, e. g., “You believe Brown to be honest.” Such a 
judgment also I might effectively handle as a constituent element of 
the interrogative judgment. But I could not find for it, in any lan¬ 
guage that I know of, a condensed expression like the “Brown is 
honest,” which I use to express my own belief in his being honest. 
That is, no variant or single substitute for “is” will change “Brown is 
honest” from the expression of my belief into the expression of my 
belief (or hope, or expectation, etc.) that you believe. In short, there 
seems to be no opportunity for condensation, such as is required to 
change “I wish you to tell me your believing-or-disbelieving the truth 
of Brown to be honest” into a question, e. g., ‘■Is Brown honest?” 
