460 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 
ployed. Confining attention for the moment to the perpen¬ 
dicular expression, I note that “Brown” and “honest” will ap¬ 
pear in the conventional question “Is Brown honest?” That is, 
the ideas expressed by these words will have, each one, its spe¬ 
cial symbol: neither of them will be incorporated in the mean¬ 
ing of any substitute for words employed in the diagram. There 
remain then, subject to possible incorporation, the more or less 
composite ideas expressed by “I,” “believe-or-disbelieve,” “the 
truth of” and “to be.” 
How all these four ideas together could be expressed by a 
single word, if only, instead of the meaning expressed by 
“believe-or-disbelieve,” I had the meaning expressed by “believe” 
alone. For instance, in “Brown is honest” (Qonf. illustration 
p. 392 ; also p. 394) the “is” expresses all that is expressed by “I 
believe the truth of Brown to be honest,” except what is ex¬ 
pressed by “Brown” and “honest.” The “is” in this case may 
then be defined as meaning “I,” “believe,” “the truth of”. 
“to he”. 
Let now a, different “is” be conceived, with the partly inde¬ 
finite meaning expressed as follows: “I,” “believe-or-dis¬ 
believe,” “the truth of”.“to be”. This indefinite 
“is,” which I am going to try to develop into an interrogative 
“is,” may be distinguished by writing it with italics—according^ 
ly, is. 
The use of such an is will effect, of course, an important gain 
in brevity; but it will sacrifice by just so much the power of 
directing special attention to any particular one of the elements 
wdiich it expresses. It can not indicate which one of these I 
wish you to regard as simultaneous judgment-factor. But it 
does not need to do this. It is true that, of all these elements— 
namely, “I,” “believe-or-disbelieve,” “the truth” and “to-be”— 
I wish you to use, as simultaneous factor, only a particular one. 
But that one is clearly indicated by the very nature of the case. 
Being what I wish you tot tell me, it will surely not be what is 
already in my mind and quite distinct—mot, that is, a definite 
element—not an element expressible by “I,” “the truth” or “to 
be.” It can therefore only be the element expressible by 
“believe-or-disbelieve. ” 
I propose, accordingly, to substitute the indefinite is for the 
“I believe-or-disbelieve the truth of .... to be” of the preced¬ 
ing diagram. As to the place in which to put this is, I note 
