Owen—Relations Expressed by the Passive Voice. 127 
actor (“omnes”) shall be ranked as passive—and the passive 
of “emit.” 
As however in Case I relation of the action to its actor was 
expressed exclusively by prepositions, it can hardly be ex¬ 
pected that the preposition in the present case will abdicate 
in favor of the verb. Indeed I do not at this writing know 
of any verbal form of which the meaning can he stretched to 
cover this relation. The sole approximation, even merely 
formal, is afforded by expressions such as “Itur ah omnibus,” 
which, masquerading as the passive paraphrase of “Omnes 
emit,” has been tolerated more or less, unflinchingly by lan¬ 
guage students. A moment’s observation shows however, as 
it seems to me, that in “Itur ab omnibus” the relation of ac¬ 
tion (going) to actor (“omnibus”) is well expressed by “ab”; 
and I see no reason for believing that it is again expressed by 
“Itur.” However much opinion differ in particulars, it seems 
to me it will agree upon the meaning of “Itur (ab omnibus)” 
as of the type expressed by “Something is done (by all)”—a 
type which might be disregarded, as apparently a rather unim¬ 
portant variant of Case I. 
I wish however not to leave this difficult case without establishing 
its nature somewhat more exactly; and, in doing so, I need the aid 
of what I must content myself with posing now as postulates, yet 
hoping that they may seem plausible enough to invite assent, though 
unsupported by the reasoning which attended them in previous pub¬ 
lications.* 
A minimal or unextended judgment, as it seems to me, consists, in 
ordinary thinking, of a thought (i. e. two terms and their relation, 
see p. 37) and belief in its “truth,” by which I mean its being 
matched by external reality. This truth is first, no doubt, associated 
by the mind with total thought. But the associations utilized in the 
linguistic thought-construction commonly are much more special: 
an obviously genuine associate of total thought is frequently displaced 
by an associate of one thought element; in particular the place of 
truth conceived as spreading over total thought, is taken by the 
suitableness of a single term (to the completion of true thought)—that 
is, by rightness. 
Belief in rightness, which is my interpretation of affirmative as¬ 
sertion, might no doubt associate itself with any element of thought/} - 
* See Interrogatives, pp. 376-380, etc. 
f Such freedom of association often is suggested, if not indeed 
established. Thus, in “(What is the relation of A and B?—A equals 
