128 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letter 
But in actual linguistic practice the belief in rightness (i. e. the as¬ 
sertion) clings to the relation—to the most important element of 
thought. I say the most important, for the earlier thinking surely 
was the finding of relations for already given terms, and not the 
finding of the terms to suit already given relations.* * The sheep which 
was found occasioned more rejoicing than its fellows which had not 
necessitated any search. This prestige relation never abrogated. Re¬ 
lation was accepted as the nucleus of thought; and hence with it 
particularly, truth of total thought—made over into rightness of a 
single element of thought—was still associated, even in the case in 
which that rightness should have been associated with some other 
element. Further when, in an extended judgment, there is more than 
one relation, the belief in rightness (i. e. the assertion) is associated 
with the focal, central, dominant relation—not with any that is mar¬ 
ginal, lateral, subordinate. Thus, in “Careful managers employ men 
of steady habits,” it is the relation found between the managers and 
men that is asserted, though relations plainly also hold between the 
managers and carefulness, between the men and habits, and between 
the habits and their steadiness. 
When moreover (1) relation is produced by (2) action, a single 
word—a verb— is made to exhibit both, and further made by suitable 
inflection (actual or virtual) to indicate (3) belief in (4) right¬ 
ness—that is, to assert affirmatively as, for instance, in “My uncle 
rents his house.” No doubt, in the expression of a judgment, it was 
possible to furnish each one of the four with a particular symbol; 
hut in actual linguistic practice, the expression of them all is forced 
upon the verb—the verb in the indicative, by which I would include 
the verb subjunctive (optative, conditional) in form alone (employed 
e. g. in certain cases to assert conclusions), and exclude the verb 
indicative in form alone, employed often when assertion certainly 
is not intended, as for instance in “I don’t believe Durand is ill,” 
of which the “is” no more expresses my belief, than would “to-be.”f 
B.—No!) G equals B,” belief in rightness, or in other words assertion, 
plainly is associated, not with “equals,” but with “C.” Or rather I 
should say that, while linguistic precedent affords no sanction for 
asserting “C,” I nevertheless distinctly indicate by emphasis that “C” 
is what I would assert, were it permitted. In short I clearly intimate 
that, in my pre-linguistic form of thinking, given “equals B,” I feel 
assured that “C” is what is needed to complete a mental picture 
matched by outer-world reality; or “C,” in other words, is right—is 
what I would assert. 
*To illustrate, doubtless primitive humanity began with reaching 
= or ;> or <% as the result of mental stimulus exerted by an A and 
B, and not with reaching B as the result of stimulus exerted by A —, 
or by A or by A <^. 
t What' are usually ranked as verbal variants, imperative (assert¬ 
ing my desire that another e. g. act) and interrogative (asserting my 
desire that you give me information as to e. g. action) I have else¬ 
where made an -effort to identify as independent verbal types. See 
“Interrogative Thought.” 
