146 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 
served from different points of view. Let then a given action 
be supposed to be correctly sensed and well enough expressed 
by “Jones went to Brown.” In this expression motion, sensed 
by Jones—who is stationed at the head of the motion-stream— 
or sensed by me who stand in thought near Jones, is motion 
from himself (or rather his initial station) toward another 
person at the foot of the stream. 
Thinking of the same occurrence now, but in the passive 
form, I start with Brown. If I wish to do so, I may also change 
the mental picture of the motion. But I must content myself 
with such a different picture as that same and unchanged motion 
offers from a different point of view. I must not—to get the 
different picture—change the motion. Bor instance, I must 
not reverse the motion-flow itself; I must not say “Brown went 
to Jones”—the statement of an altogether different occurrence, 
not at all the one I have in mind. 
Bemembering that I am to make no change in what I see, 
but only in the whence-I-see-it, I might shift my point of view 
to.anywhere you may imagine (say half-way) between 
beginning of the action and its end; but that would get me into 
trouble—I don’t exactly know how much; for, to keep in si¬ 
multaneous near-by view both Jones and Brown,* it seems to 
me that I should need to look in mind both up the stream to 
Jones and down the stream to Brown at once—to simulta¬ 
neously sense the motion as approach (to me) and as departure 
(from me) ; and I’m not so sure that I can do it. So I shift 
my view-point to the foot of the motion-stream. That is, in¬ 
stead of looking now from head to foot of the flow and seeing 
the motion as a going, I look from the foot (the view-point of 
Brown) and see it as a coming. 
If now I really were conceiving thus, I should express my¬ 
self, with small consideration for the squeamishness of Gram¬ 
mar, by the sentence “Brown was come-to by Jones.” This 
however I need not do; and ordinarily I should not even think 
* That first and last terms of a thought at least must overlap in 
consciousness is indicated by for instance “A -> B,” of which I can 
not sense the > with eimer A or B not in my mind. 
