The Peel Bank Act of 18J/4. 
401 
was immediate. All that was wanted appeared to be the assur¬ 
ance that reasonable accommodation could be had. The issue of 
notes did not exceed the legal limits that had been temporarily 
removed. 
As is the custom in England, committees were immediately 
appointed by Parliament to inquire into the causes of commer¬ 
cial destress, and the operation of the Bank Act. 1 The com¬ 
mittee of the House of Lords criticised the act. That of the 
Commons, under the influence of Peel, saw no reason for modi¬ 
fying any of its provisions. 2 
It was the crisis of 1847, therefore, that reopened the discus¬ 
sion of currency and banking in England. The act remained 
unrepealed, however, and again in the stringency of 1857, it 
was suspended and discounting allowed at 10 per cent. At this 
time the permitted issue of notes slightly exceeded the legal 
limits. During the third suspension in 1866, no infringement 
was found necessary. 
In the Parliament of 1847, Sir Robt. Peel frankly admitted that 
the prevention of panics, which was one of the objects of the 
act, had not been accomplished. 3 All the former adherents of 
the measure were, however, not so willing to admit defeat. There 
can be noticed a considerable shifting in the aims attributed 
to the Act, by its supporters, after its break-down in 1847, from 
those claimed for it immediately before and after its passage. 
In 1844 the theory leading to the Act was concisely stated, by 
1 Committees that have concerned themselves more or less with the 
operations of the Bank of England were appointed in 1819, 1832, 1840, 
1841,1847 and 1857. The condition of joint stock banks was investigated 
by the committees of 1836, 1837, and 1838. 
2 Reports from committees of both Houses of Parliament, Sess. Nov. 18, 
1847, Sept. 5,1848, Vol. VIII, parts 1, 2 & 3. Cf. Tooke, V, pp. 487-491. 
3 “The bill of 1844 had a triple object. Its first object was that in which 
I admit it has failed; namely, to prevent, by early and gradual, severe 
and sudden contraction, and the panic and confusion inseparable from 
it. But the bill had, at least, two other objects, of at least equal im¬ 
portance: the one to maintain and guarantee the convertability of the 
paper currency into gold; and the other to prevent the difficulties which 
arose at all times from undue speculation being aggravated by the abuse 
of paper credit in the form of promissory notes.” See Poor, “Money, 
its Laws and History”, p. 305. 
