Hoiv Diversity of Opinion is Possible. 
305 
it would still, like a jewel, shine by its own light as a thing 
which has its own value in itself. ” Character was precious in 
his eyes not because its effects are profitable to others, but be¬ 
cause it is attractive in itself. To the Utilitarianism of Mill 
he would doubtless have replied with Carlyle: “Is the heroic 
inspiration we call virtue but some bubble of the blood, bub¬ 
bling in the direction others profit by?“ (Sartor Resartus.) 
Observe now the contrast between such utterances and the atti¬ 
tude of Professor Sidgwick, generally admitted to be the leading 
moralist of the present time. He says: 4 “In my view, this sub¬ 
jective rightness of volition is not good in itself, but only as 
a means to the production of other good effects. ” And by these 
good effects, he means the happiness of those thereby affected 
The contradiction between these two views seems absolute ana 
complete. 
We are now face to face with the question, “How is such 
diversity of opinion possible?” Does it indicate carelessness of 
observation? Is it due to the blindness of prejudice which, 
consciously or unconsciously, is striving to force the facts into the 
moulds of some favorite theory of the nature of things? Or 
are these moralists spreading before us some phantasmagoria, 
some invention of their own brain, evolved in the solitude of 
their study and with no more relation to the facts of real life 
than the novels of Jules Verne? Certainly not the last, for 
these various theories have all found ready acceptance with 
many who are not moralists by profession, and who emphatic¬ 
ally have not spent their lives in the study. Of the Kantian 
doctrine of morals the German poet Schiller says: 5 “After the 
demonstration which he (Kant) has given us, there can be no 
more controversy among thinking men who are willing to be 
convinced. ” On the other hand, Leslie Stephen, the well known 
English man of letters, writes: 6 “Indeed the utilitarian argu¬ 
ment appears from certain points of view to be so cogent that 
one is half disposed to regard all the argumentation about 
morality as grotesque. ” Nor can carelessness or zeal in the 
4 Methods of Ethics, IV Ed. p. 395. 
5 Aestlietische Schriften , Ausgabe Kohler (Stuttgart) p. 100. 
6 Science of Ethics, p. 357. 
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