806 
Sharp—The Personal Equation in Ethics. 
service of some pet metaphysical or anti-metaphysical theory 
account for the facts of the case. The explanation of the con¬ 
tradictory statements of students of ethics is mainly to be 
found, I believe, in the influence of what I have called the per¬ 
sonal equation of these writers themselves. Its origin and its 
nature I shall now endeavor to point out. 
The moralist, like all other members of the human race, has 
grown up in a community which possesses a code of moral 
rules. These rules he probably makes it a matter of principle 
to obey, regardless of whether so doing happens to be agree¬ 
able or not. Now the motives which habitually impel to such 
action so far from being reducible to a single one, really amount 
to a considerable number. They will doubtless be present in 
varying degrees of intensity in any given individual, but in 
comparison with the rest some one is almost certain to be so 
strong as to overshadow all the others. When such a person 
comes to make a systematic study of the moral life, if he 
follows the hitherto general practice of treating his own ex¬ 
perience as typical of that of the race, this dominating motive is 
sure to get more than its fair share of the attention and to be made 
to play the role of the sole fundamental moral force. Its sig¬ 
nificance for the race is measured by the position it occupies 
among his own springs of action. But, it will be asked, when 
confronted with the reports of experience different from his own, 
why does he not instantly recognize the narrowness of his own 
theory and proceed to correct and supplement it by making a 
place in it for the new facts? To understand this we must call 
to mind the not unfamiliar distinction between moral and non- 
moral motives for obedience to the commands of conscience. Of the 
former, self-respect and unselfish devotion to the good of others 
are sufficient examples. The latter are such as dislike for the 
penitentiary as a place of residence, fear of eternal damnation, 
fear of Mrs. Grundy and of loss of social position. The distinc¬ 
tion between the two is to be found in the fact that the latter 
merely lead us to act in outward conformity to what society 
agrees to call right, while the latter, in addition to this, make 
us approve of right action both in self and others. The would- 
be criminal, for example, hates the moral law, would break it if 
