Influence of the Personal Equation . 
807 
he dared, and considers every one a fool who is not like minded. 
The man of high principles, on the other hand, longs to bring 
every impulse and every thought more and more completely 
under its sway. Of course it is not meant that fear of punish¬ 
ment is an immoral spring of action, but simply that, like dis¬ 
like of poverty or physical pain, it is morally indifferent, i. e., 
may lead, according to circumstances, to actions which are either 
good or bad. In applying this distinction to the problem be¬ 
fore us, we must premise that it has always been taken for 
granted that there can exist but one moral spring of action. 
For it has been declared impossible to bring our ethical judg 
ments into the form of a consistent system unless the grounds 
of approbation are reducible to a single one. Now when the mor¬ 
alist with a moral life under the more or less complete domina¬ 
tion of a single principle, as' we have seen is usually the case, 
is met by a man who claims that his motive for right action 
is an entirely different one, he seems placed before the follow¬ 
ing dilemma: Either his neighbor has made the mistake of 
confounding one of the non-moral impulses with the moral motive, 
or else his own cherished ideals are non-moral in their character. 
Such an admission no earnest man will readily consent to make. 
Take for example a man with a keen sense for the beautiful 
in conduct; one whose deepest aspirations find expression in the 
words of our beloved poet: 
“ Build thee more stately mansions, O my soul, 
As the swift seasons roll.” 
Suppose him moreover to have no exceptionally intense sym¬ 
pathies beyond the circle of his family and personal acquaint¬ 
ances. Such a one is the friend whom I referred to above as 
saying, “I can not say that I am especially interested in the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number. ” He will doubtless 
reason as follows: I am leading or at least trying to lead a life 
of devotion to the right. But the general diffusion of happi¬ 
ness is not my usual motive for denying myself pleasure, nor 
is it my reason for approving such sacrifice when made by 
others. Nor, if the happiness of the race were really the 
moral end, would morality ever appeal to me as something wor¬ 
thy to claim the supreme place in my life. But it does thus appeal 
