380 Jones—Relation of Economic Grises to Legislation. 
garding the privileges of the Bank of France. 1 From within 
the bank itself also, came a strong objection to the additional 
control which the government assumed in connection with the 
legislation of 1848, and this was accompanied with a bitter pro¬ 
test against the general centralizing tendency manifesting itself 
in France. 2 A governor and two assistants were to be appointed 
by the Emperor following the law of 1806. These officers, it 
was noticed, took oath to govern the bank, and in this way it 
was felt that the power of the directors was liable to diminish to a 
merely supervisory one. 3 Three at least of the regents were to 
be chosen from the treasury agents of the government, located 
in the provinces. This insured a strong and constant repre¬ 
sentation for the state within this council of the share-holders. 4 
It was never forgotten that the bank was the creature of Na¬ 
poleon I, 5 and it seemed to many that it embodied too much of 
1 Laveleye, Rev. d. d. Mondes, 186% p. 433. 
2 In a discussion in the Chamber of Deputies, in 1847, over the smallest 
denomination of note issue, Alex. Clapier said: “The real interest of 
the measure is not an immediate discount interest; it is an interest of 
the future. The Bank of France cherishes a plan which it does not 
conceal; it wishes to absorb within itself all the provincial banks, and 
to attain this result it tries to attract to its vaults all the money of the 
country. For my part I think this would be an immense danger. I 
have heard it said, upon a recent occasion, that one of the dangers, one 
of the inconveniences of our political situation was this excessive cen¬ 
tralization which puts in the hands of power all the places, all the 
offices of the country, and it was said that the power, which can dispose 
of all the places and all the offices, holds in its hands all the votes, all 
the consciences. Well, I say that there is a concentration more dangerous 
than that of the places and offices; it is that of fortunes and credit. An 
establishment holding in its hands all the country’s credit would hold 
more than all the country's votes; it would hold the existence of every 
body. There must be one of two things; either this establishment 
would be in the government, or it would be outside of the government. 
If it were outside of the government, it would be the stronger and would 
crush it; if it were in the government, the government would be stronger 
than anything else and would crush us.” Banker’s Magazine, vol. 46 
March, 1892, p. 701. Original French in Courtois’ “Historie des Banques 
en France,” p. 167, note. 
3 Courtois in Banker’s Magazine, vol. 46, pp. 540-541. 
4 Palgrave “Dictionary of Pol. Econ.,” vol. 1, p. 97. 
5 For examples of this see E. Fournier de Flaix “Revue d’Economie 
Politique,” Tome V, p. 205, also Courtois, op. cit. p. 540 and 706. 
