BERRY V. HENDERSON. 
567 
every time he put prussic acid, or tartar emetic, or cyanide of potassium,—which, I see, is 
another article mentioned in the schedule,—into a prescription, he was not only bound to 
put the name of the medicine outside, and how it was to be taken, hut, in addition to that, 
to label it “ poison and also that then it was to be entered in a particular book, with the 
name and address of the purchaser, and even the very object stated for which it was wanted. 
If your lordships will look at the character of the things, you will see what the idea is. 
Some of them are well known, and are used for improper purposes. You will see at once 
what the idea is. 
Mr. Justice Hannen. —It would require, apparently, the name of the purchaser, and the 
person who introduced him also. 
Mr. Quain. —And the signature, and the purpose for which it was required, the name 
and quantity of the poison, the name of the purchaser, and so on. I apprehend, therefore, 
that it cannot be a poison within the meaning of that Act, and I have brought it within 
the meaning of the proviso, and shown it to be a medicine, and that he has dona fide com¬ 
plied with the Act of Parliament. Then, lastly, it cannot be seriously contended that he 
can be convicted of two penalties for the same act. They first convicted him of selling 
poison to a person unknown, without being introduced by a person known, and then they 
convicted him in another distinct penalty for identically the same act on the same day, for 
sending out and dispensing a poison without having a proper label on it. It is scarcely 
necessary to cite cases to show that that cannot be done. That is the only other point ill 
the case. 
Mr. Lumley Smith. —I appear to support the conviction on this occasion ; and, with 
respect to the point that my learned friend has alluded to, of the Pharmacy Act of 1S69 
having come into operation on the very day on which this offence was said to have been 
committed, I should not wish to give him or your lordships any trouble as to that, because it is 
important, both to the police authorities, by whom this conviction was obtained, and it is im¬ 
portant also to all the chemists of the United Kingdom, that the present state of the law 
should be declared, and not that we should have a decision upon an Act that is no longer in 
force. So that, as far as that question is concerned, I am perfectly willing, for the purpose 
of this argument and on public grounds, to admit that the second Act was in force. But it 
appears to me that that will make no difference in fact, because it merely changes the terms 
of the proviso within which the appellant has to bring himself. I shall submit to the Court 
that clearly it does come within the first part of the 17th section, unless he brings himself 
and the burden of proof is on him to bring himself—-within the proviso at the end of that 
section, or within the proviso of the Act of 1869. Now, my lords, I submit, in the first 
place, this is clearly one of those cases which the Act of Parliament was intended to meet. 
Here, in fact, we find from the case that a man has attempted to commit suicide. It is 
found that he has done so. 
Mr. Quain. —Oh, no ! 
Mr. Lumley Smith. —It states that he has attempted to commit suicide. 
Mr. Justice Hannen. —No, he is charged with it. 
Mr. Lumley Smith. —He is charged with having attempted to commit suicide with 
this— 
Mr. Quain. —No, not with this. Pardon me, that is not the state of the case at all. 
Mr. Lumley Smith.— It is sufficiently clear. 
Mr. Quain.— Oh, no, that will not do. It is not so stated. And your lordships will 
remember this is a penal application. 
Mr. Lumley Smith. —It brings it back to this. Is a chemist entitled to sell poison in 
the way in which this chemist appears to have done without the restrictions that are put 
upon it by the first part of the section 17 ? Now', my lords, I submit that the object of 
this statute was twofold. The first object was to prevent poisons being obtained for im¬ 
proper purposes, and in the next place to preserve evidence ot the person to whom the 
poison wa 3 supplied by the chemist. And that does away with the objection that was sug¬ 
gested just now, that in the case of an actual apothecary, a legally qualified apothecary, sup¬ 
plying any mediciue to a patient, it would be unnecessary, in a case ot that sort, to have 
these labels placed upon the bottles, because the law relies on his knowledge, his skill, and 
care, and that in a case of that sort there w'ould be neither the danger of poisons being em¬ 
ployed or obtained for an improper purpose, nor any danger of the poisons beiug delivered 
to a person of w'hom no record was kept. T submit, in the first place, that clearly this case 
