AN APOLOGUE OF CORPOREAL AND COSMICAL INFINITY. 
711 
of justice, especially as lie liiruself admits a certain ambiguity of expression. 
As he very truly observes, many of these misunderstandings arise from the 
unfortunate use of the same word to siguify both cause and effect.* 
But 1 am still at a loss to understand in what sense he considers that heat, 
light, etc., are motion; whether by these terms he means the forces which pro¬ 
duce the phenomena we call heat and light; or whether he means the pheno¬ 
mena themselves. As I understand the matter, the series runs thus,—1st, the 
agent or cause, A ; 2nd, a certain movement produced by this agent, M ; 3rd, 
certain phenomena which are the result of this movement, Ph. Now, which of 
the two, phenomenal heat (Ph) or causal heat (A), is it that Mr, Tilden affirms 
to be motion (M) ? From his treatise in the last number, § 1, it would appear 
that he means causal heat. But to style this motion—be. to say that A is 
M—would be to affirm the species of the genus, the lower of the higher term. 
But in the paper now under notice, where he says, “ the phenomena which we 
attribute to a something we usually call heat, are the effects of a particular kind 
of molecular movement,” he appears to mean phenomenal heat. 
In conclusion, Mr. Tilden thinks that the form of my objection to his posi¬ 
tion, that heat, light, etc., are motion, would be paralleled by such reasoning as 
red, yellow, and blue are colours ; therefore, as those things which are equal to 
the same thing are equal to each other, red, yellow, and blue are the same. 
This would be true enough if I could have supposed a gentleman of his attain¬ 
ments to have meant by light and heat the sensible phenomena, popularly so 
termed. But I took for granted, as I think I had a right to do, that by those 
terms he meant the active agencies, the causes of the various phenomena. 
AN APOLOGUE OF CORPOREAL AND COSMICAL INFINITY. 
BY FRA : OLLAL—PART II. USQUE AD * *. 
“ Sermons in Stones.” 
(Continued from page, 638.) 
My friend resumed his discourse as follows :— 
u Since no man, as the ancients so justly moralized, can be pronounced for¬ 
tunate till after his departure, it may be wiser for you to await the conclusion 
of the day before you decide that it is worthy of such commemoration. But, 
in a more commonplace sense than that of your allusion, for you, at any rate, 
the day will be marked by A stone,—the stone which has furnished the‘text of 
our discourse. But this, I must tell you, has, as yet, only got through its pre¬ 
liminary stage; since all that I have been saying this morning has only been 
intended as a preparation for, and by way of prelude to what I really desire to 
place before you. And if, when I have concluded, you shall not find yourself 
wearied, then you may, if you please, drop your white stone into the casket, 
which, when at the end of your course, you come to reckon them up, will be 
found to contain so few of that pure colour; for who among us is there that 
* Unhappily, our English language is quite destitute of terminations to denote the 
difference—not so much between cause and effect as—between the act and the tact; the actot 
doing and the thing done; a distinction embodied in the Greek terminals -sis and -ma, and in 
the Latin -tio and -turn. Especially that large class of English nouns ending in -tion, almost 
all denote indiscriminately both the act and the fact. Thus, conception stands both for the 
act of conceiving, and for the thought conceived; motion for the act of moving, and the fact 
of movement, etc. 
