263 
BRAMBLES AND BAY LEAVES. 
aonT mean to say that all talking birds speak with simi¬ 
lar purpose and appropriateness. 
Myself .—No : that is simply because they differ in 
degrees of intelligence, Poll does not understand the 
words she utters as we understand them, but by constant 
practice and observation she has learnt to associate cer¬ 
tain speeches with certain events, and that act of associa¬ 
tion it is that charms and surprises us. But it ought 
not to surprise us, for no vertebrate animal could exist 
unless capable of thinking. 
Friend. —“Thinking!” well, you may almost say “think¬ 
ing,” for instinct manifests itself in marvellous ways occa¬ 
sionally, and comes very near to the borders of thought. 
Myself .—When I say “ thinking,” I mean thinking: 
they think as we do; their range of thought is limited, 
but is equal to the range of their existence, and it is a 
settled conviction of mine (not hastily adopted), that 
animals possess a power of ratiocination of precisely the 
same kind as that possessed by man. 
Friend .—What you mean is, that instinct often resem¬ 
bles intelligence, and might be mistaken for intelligence, 
did we not know that man is the sole possessor of reason. 
Myself. —No: that is not what I mean. I say that 
that parrot and that dog both reason upon events and 
circumstances in the same way as I do, and to an extent 
commensurate with their wants and their place in the or¬ 
der of creation. Man is not the sole possessor of reason. 
Friend .—Then you admit Pido to an equality with 
yourself. 
Myself .—Yes : in the possession of the faculty of rea¬ 
soning I do. But mark: his reasoning powers are 
