APPENDIX. 
31 
doubtful whether it possesses the means or capacity of 
organizing and supporting a force of this nature even upon 
the slenderest scale. Its financial system, as already 
mentioned, is rude and inefficient in the extreme. The 
chiefs appear to possess neither public spirit, courage, nor 
intelligence; and the genius of Burman institutions, civil 
and religious, is far from being calculated to generate 
military habits and feelings among the mass of the people. 
From the little I have had an opportunity of seeing of 
the Burmans, I do not hesitate to consider them as being, 
in comparison with all the military tribes of India, a people 
eminently tame and unwarlike. 
The extreme jealousy which exists on the part of the 
Government and its officers towards Europeans of every 
denomination, and the illiberal and parsimonious manner 
in which they are treated, will always exclude persons of 
character and talent, capable of imparting to their troops 
any respectable share of European discipline and tactics, 
from entering into their service; and the few foreigners 
who may be content to remain among them under such 
circumstances, will generally therefore consist of worthless 
characters of the lowest order, from whose instructions or 
example they can reap no advantage. 
Should the Burmese again resolve upon entering into a 
war, it deserves to be considered towards what portion of 
our frontier their hostility will most probably be directed. 
Considering our means of defence, and the strength of our 
positions on the Saluen frontier, there is, I conceive, little 
to be apprehended from Burmese aggression in this quarter, 
while they are themselves on the contrary extremely open 
to attack. From all I can understand, the Aracan fron¬ 
tier, which has a strong natural boundary, and few roads 
or passes practicable for an army, is equally secure. 
The weakest point of the frontier established by the 
