“ THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS.'' 
Ill 
Parts (II. and III.), “The Inductions of Ethics” and “ The Ethics 
of Individual Life.” The various chapters will be severally analysed 
and expounded by members of the Section, and I can only here 
indicate the merest outline of their contents. Moreover, as we 
well know, it is immensely difficult to condense Herbert Spencer’s 
writings without injury to the context. 
In “ The Inductions of Ethics” (II.) in relation to the confusion 
of ethical thought, it is pointed out that “ survival of the fittest 
ensures that the faculties of every species of creature—man 
included—tend to adapt themselves to its mode of life.” In the 
struggle for existence consequent on the evolution of the human 
family its members “ have had continually to carry on external self- 
defence and internal co-operation—external antagonism and 
internal friendship. Hence their members have required two 
different sets of sentiments and ideas adjusted to these two kinds 
of activity.” In another work, “ The Study of Sociology,” in 
relation to the “Educational Bias,” Mr. Spencer has already 
told us that “ The religion of enmity nearly all men actually 
believe. The religion of amity most of them merely believe 
that they believe.” Thus the ethics of enmity and the ethics 
of amity conflict. In discussing “ What Ideas and Senti¬ 
ments are Ethical,” Mr. Spencer shows that “ throughout the 
past, and down to present days in most minds, conceptions of 
right and wrong have been directly associated with supposed 
Divine injunction. Acts have been classed as good or bad, not 
because of their intrinsic natures, but because of their extrinsic 
derivations; and virtue has consisted in obedience.” In early 
stages of society especially, and to a large extent in later stages, 
the idea of ought is associated with conformity to established customs 
apart from their natures—whether ethically good or bad—customs 
evolve into laws, and ought is associated with obedience to such 
laws. Therefore the conceptions of right , obligation , duty, and the 
associated sentiments cover a wider range than conduct as ordinarily 
conceived by moral science. Thus there arises an ethical and a pro- 
ethical sentiment. The chapters which follow, “ treating inductively 
of ideas and feelings about conduct displayed by mankind at large,” 
May, 1893. 
