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THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS. 
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Regarding culture Mr. Spencer lias much to say, but his ultimate 
decision is that “ In culture, as in other things, men tend towards 
one or other extreme. Either, as with the great majority, culture 
is scarcely pursued at all, or, as with the few, it is pursued almost 
exclusively, and often with disastrous results ”—and, therefore, 
“ though aesthetic culture has to be recognised as ethically 
sanctioned, yet instead of emphasising the demand for it, there is 
far greater occasion for condemning the excess of it.” In relation 
to Amusements, Mr. Spencer’s opinions will probably surprise those 
who are not already familiar with his broad and catholic 
teaching. “ On each person,” he says, “ there is imposed 
not only the peremptory obligation so to carry on his life 
as to avoid inequitably interfering with the carrying on of others’ 
lives, and not only the less peremptory obligation to aid under 
various circumstances the carrying on of their lives, but there is 
imposed some obligation to increase the pleasures of their lives by 
sociality, and by the cultivation of those powers which conduce to 
sociality.” But Mr. Spencer pushes the matter still further, and 
goes so far as to say that: “ A man may be a good economical 
unit of society, while remaining otherwise an almost worthless 
unit. If he has no knowledge of the arts, no aesthetic feelings, no 
interest in fiction, the drama, poetry, or music—if he cannot join 
in any of those amusements, which, daily and at longer intervals, 
fill leisure spaces in life—if he is thus one to whom others cannot 
readily give pleasure, at the same time that he can give no pleasure 
to others, he becomes in great measure a dead unit, and unless he 
has some special value might better be out of the way.” Under 
the head of “ Marriage,” concerning the selection of wife by husband, 
and husband by wife, “ Ethics ” (says Mr. Spencer) “ has very 
decisive things to say.” After pointing out in bold criticism that 
“current conversation proves how low is current thought and 
sentiment about these questions,” he goes on to maintain that 
“the first ground of ethical judgment is the reciprocal state of 
feeling prompting the union.” The mariage de convenance has his 
severest condemnation. Psychical and physiological considerations 
come next in order, and the effects of “ a feeble mind or a bad 
May, 1893. 
