112 
VOLITION. 
from them. 1 ’ Here the emotions, and the whole force of 
moral automatism, were enlisted against the insane impulse, 
which thus seemed not a part of the character—not, so to 
speak, a part of the self—but a wicked suggestion from with¬ 
out. 
The subject, perhaps, will be clearer if we study the 
nature of initiation and inhibition in the lower centres. 
Even the spinal cord can originate; as we learn from that 
well-known brainless frog, who when a spot of acid is 
dropped on the inner surface of his thigh, will try to rub it 
off with the foot of the same leg, and if this foot be cut off, 
will use the other. Mr. Lewes tells us that it is not everv 
«/ 
frog who hits on this expedient, for sometimes a frog will 
bend its body towards the injured leg, “so as to permit the 
spot to be rubbed against the flank.” A brainless animal 
can even learn to execute combined movements ; that is, 
actions which, if conscious, would be called volitional now 
become automatic in the ordinarv sense of that term. 
“There is,” says Freuberg, “a decided improvement acquired 
in the reactions of the motor-centres after divisions of the 
spinal cord, not indeed in vigour, but in delicacy. Removed 
from the regulating influence of the brain, the legs acquire 
through practice a power of self-regulation.”* 
These are examples of that wonderful power of self¬ 
adaptation to the environment, which is not confined to 
nervous tissue, but is manifested even by' the lowest 
organisms, at least as regards the absorption and assimilation 
of food, and is shown by higher animals not only in their 
voluntary actions, but in their organic functions, and in 
the phenomena of acclimatisation, possibly also in other 
phenomena, not completely explicable by the Natural 
Selection hypothesis. Indeed, this power of organised 
tissues may perhaps be regarded rather as a condition than 
as a product of Natural Selection. Could we discover all 
its conditions, even self-adaptation might reveal itself as 
automatic, although depending on adjustments so delicate 
as to transcend all ordinary conceptions of automatism. 
But to return to the pithed frog. 
The self-adaptation of the spinal cord is not volitional, 
because not conscious; but, since it involves a variation of the 
habitual course of action, it corresponds with volition on the 
objective or physiological side. The only difference is, that 
the sense of conscious effort, or the subjective side of 
volition, is absent. Initiatory volitions, then, have their 
counterpart in the functions of the spinal cord. 
Quoted m “ Physical Basis of Mind.” 
