62 
THE DATA OF ETHICS. 
from hypothesis to phenomena, as well as upward from 
phenomena to law. This view is so important that I must 
quote Mr. Spencer’s own words, contained in a letter to Mr. 
Mill:—“ I conceive it to be the business of moral science to 
deduce, from the laws of life and the conditions of existence, 
what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness, 
and what kinds to produce unhappiness. Having done this, 
its deductions are to be recognised as laws of conduct, and 
are to be conformed to, irrespective of a direct estimation of 
happiness or misery. Perhaps an analogy will most clearly 
show my meaning. During its early stages, planetary 
astronomy consisted of nothing more than accumulated 
observations respecting the positions and motions of the sun 
and planets. . . . But the modern science of planetary 
astronomy consists of deductions from the law of gravitation 
—deductions showing why the celestial bodies necessarily 
occupy certain places at certain times. Now, the kind of 
relation which thus exists between ancient and modern 
astronomy is analogous to the kind of relation which I con¬ 
ceive exists between the expediency-morality, and moral 
science properly so-called.”* 
In this scientific and rational conception will be found the 
true answer to the objections so often and so forcibly urged 
against utilitarianism. It is repugnant to common sense 
and common feeling to assert that everyone is or ought to be 
at every moment consciously engaged in the pursuit of 
happiness, either for himself or for society. We know very 
well that many of our actions, although they may have 
pleasure as their impulse, yet have not pleasure as their 
conscious goal. “ Every man acting voluntarily, does what he 
under all the circumstances prefers to do ” is a perfectly true 
saying. But the seeming corollary, “ he does it because 
he prefers to do it,” is really ambiguous, and stealthily intro¬ 
duces a new and questionable idea. It is the seemingly 
innocent little word “ because ” which must bear the blame. 
For a confusion at once arises between the final cause and 
the efficient cause of the action; between the inclination 
which prompted it, and the object towards which that incli¬ 
nation was directed. My inclination prompts me to paint 
a picture or write a poem ; but I do not take the incli¬ 
nation twice over, and make it into an object. My object is 
not satisfaction to myself, but the true expression of my 
thought. This expression will indeed bring me satisfaction, 
but I shall not work so well if I think very much about 
* “ Data of Ethics,” Ch. IV., § 21. 
