54G 
JOURNAL OF HORTICULTURE AND COTTAGE GARDENER. 
Eecember 13, 1894. 
flideration ; justice to exhibitors is the great point borne in mind. In 
this particular case not one of the three judges nor the three “out¬ 
siders ” could observe the slightest distinction between the bloom 
named Beauty of Teignmouth and Duke of York in several other stands 
in the show. Surely, now the difference could not have been so great 
as some would have us believe, or one of the six must have detected it. 
Does it seem possible that after such an exhaustive overhauling of the 
blooms that they were still distinct, and six men could not see it ? To 
me it savours of the ridiculous. Writers and readers of this corre¬ 
spondence should know that we did not accept the Duke of York bloom 
in the disqualified stand as the comparing specimen, because, from that 
enthusiastic amateur Mr. G. Crabbe’s own showing, it was not a typical 
one. By testing the supposed Beauty of Teignmouth with several other 
Duke of York blooms in the show, and finding them identical, could not 
be in favour of Mr. Crabbe’s argument. If there was the slightest 
difference it must have been perceptible somewhere, because the blooms 
were grown under varying conditions. 
Another paragraph in Mr. Crabbe’s note (page 523) has a damaging 
effect upon his own argument. He says one variety is a month earlier 
than the other. Need I say more upon this point ? Surely a clear 
distinction should have been apparent. Six men failed to find it. It 
may suit Mr. Crabbe’s purpose of argument to describe the habit of 
growth and shape of the leaf so scientifically, but he should bear in 
mind that these points were not in dispute, nor were they present on the 
day. The question was confined to two blooms staged on November 
9th, and not with the plants or with blooms seen since. From the 
evidence before us I never saw a case that called for disqualification 
more clearly than this. 
Messrs. W. Hannaford & Son are quite right in saying the bloom 
named Beauty of Teignmouth was brighter in colour than the Duke of 
York in Mr. Foster’s stand. This, as I have previously pointed out, 
was not a typical one. This is a point never in dispute.— 
E. Molyneux. 
Disqualified Exhibits. 
I FEAR Mr. Filkins (page 522) has not read the regulations of the 
National Chrysanthemum Society, for Kegulation 1 says that there is 
no limit as to size of board in any classes where Japanese blooms are 
exhibited. Surely this is plain enough. He also fails to see where 
the riddle comes in. I do not; however, I hope we may have a 
thoroughly friendly discussion, and that it will be the means of teaching 
committees a lesson, so that there may be no two meanings in the 
wording of schedules in future. The Kent County authorities are not 
the only ones who err in this matter. 
As regard the Battersea disqualification, I naturally took the Secre¬ 
tary’s post-card for my guide (although their regulations are more to 
the point), when he wrote, “ You may exhibit under exactly the same 
conditions as prevail in the N.C.S.’’ The time for reply was short, and 
he wrote without the Committee’s knowledge ; however, as this Society 
is young and the officials were all so extremely sorry for the misunder¬ 
standing, and were, as they said, willing to make an apology, I am 
sure I as gladly and willingly accept it, and wish them every success.— 
—W. Wells. 
Disqualification of Mr. Wells at Blackheath. 
Mr. Filkins (page 522) writes thus :—“Your correspondent, ‘Lex,’ 
in his letter on page 500 put (.jfc) a construction on my letter (page 450) 
to (sic) Mr. Wells that is misleading. According to ‘ Lex’s ’ quotation 
I am made to say that ‘ Rule 8 of the Kent County Chrysanthemum 
schedule definitely states that the boards shall be 24 inches long and 
18 wide ; ’ but that is what I do not do.” 
I quote DOW, as I quoted before, verhatim et literatim from your 
correspondent’s letter of the 15th November last (page 450). “ I fail to 
see where the riddle comes in, for Regulation 8 of the Kent County 
Chrysanthemwn Society definitely states that the hoards shall he 
24 inches long and 18 wide." (The italics are mine). Mr. Filkins, 
having written those words on the 15th of November last, now tells us 
that that is what he did not do. What does Mr. Filkins mean ? Does 
he suggest that there are two editions of the Journal of Horticulture 
giving different versions of his letter ? If not, will he indicate the 
difference between his original letter and my quotation of it ? The 
only variation that I can see is that your correspondent attributes to 
me the word “ rule,” whereas he wrote “ regulation,” not a very 
important matter even were he correct, but he is not, for my quotation 
(page 500) of his letter says “regulation.” So, Mr. Filkins, in this 
respect, misquotes my quotation. 
As 1 have already pointed out, '• Regulation 8 ” does not “ definitely 
state ” anything of the sort. It merely “ requests ” the exhibitor to 
conform to certain methods of staging bis blooms, and the point is 
whether a request, in this connection, amounts to anything more than 
the indication of a preference, which, for the reasons already given, I 
do not think that it does. However, Mr. Filkins, not apparently being 
able to understand what he himself has written, it is not very surprising 
-that he entirely fails to grasp the meaning of Mr. Wells. 
Mr. Filkins now tells us that, “ The point raised by Mr. Wells was, 
‘ What is the metropolitan plan V ” The “ point raised by Mr. Wells ” 
was nothing so absurd, for “Regulation 8” gives him the information 
in the clearest terms ; if, indeed, one can imagine Mr. Wells as needing 
it. Mr. Wells’ “point’’was exactly that stated above—i.c., the effect 
of the word “ requested.” But let Mr. Wells speak for himself. 
Writing to the Journal of Horticulture November 8th, 1894 (page 427) 
Mr. Wells says, “ Exhibitors are requested to have their stands made in 
accordance with the metropolitan plan, &c. What does this mean ? ” 
And again, writing to the Gardeners' Magazine, December 1st, 1894 
(page 727), he says, “ Certainly I do not see by their requesting exhi¬ 
bitors to use boards a certain size they can compel it by such wording.” 
(The italics are those of Mr. Wells). If Mr. Wells has failed to make 
clear the fact that he does raise the question of the effect of a “ request ” 
as distinguished from a “direction” I think that he had better abandon 
the attempt in despair, for clearly the English language will not serve 
him to convey his meaning. 
But the point is not whether Mr. Filkins does or does not understand 
Mr. Wells; the latter, at any- rate, has made the question which he 
wishes to raise clear enough to ordinary minds. This question has, 
however, further aspects than those presented by Mr. Wells’ corre¬ 
spondence. 
Since my last letter I have obtained a copy of the Kent County 
Chrysanthemum Society’s schedule, and I find, at the foot of the 
“ General Regulations for the Exhibition,” the following words :— 
“ N.B.—These regulations will be strictly adhered to, and any infringe¬ 
ment will disqualify exhibitors.” That the employment of the word 
“ requested ” in the eighth regulation, standing alone, would give the 
exhibitor an “ option ” I am quite clear. But now arises the further 
question, “ What is the effect of the ‘ foot-note ? ’ has it the effect of 
negativing the idea of an ‘option,’ and of converting the ‘ request’ into 
a ‘ direction,’ the disregard of which will entail penal consequences— i.e., 
disqualification ? ” 
The answer to this question must depend upon a consideration of the 
character of the eleven paragraphs which go to make up the so-called 
“ general regulations.” Do these, in fact, constitute a series of stipula¬ 
tions and regulations directly affecting the conduct of the exhibitor, so 
that disqualification may naturally attach to their disregard ? or, are 
they but a loose and general collection of “ directions,” “ requests,” and 
“suggestions” for the guidance of committee, judges, and others besides 
exhibitors under the heading of “ general regulations ?” In short, under 
these conditions, has the “ foot-note” any other real meaning than this, 
that disqualification will certainly be applied ivhere disqualification is 
qorovided for, and that there will be a strict enforcement, and not laxity, 
in the general application of the regulations ? I think that an examina¬ 
tion of the regulations will clearly show that the latter only is the 
correct interpretation of the “ foot-note.” 
Certain of the regulations, such as 4 and 7, have nothing whatever 
to do with exhibitors, nor could disqualification well apply to No. 5. 
No. 1 stipulates that all exhibitors shall give “three clear days’ notice 
of t’neir intention to exhibit.” This is a “direction,” not a mere 
“request.” May I ask. Is it contended that non-compliance with this 
regulation brings with it, ijoso facto, disqualification; and will the 
Secretary of the Society state that no entry received after the period 
indicated has ever been accepted by the Committee, or by those 
representing it, without public disqualification resulting? And, if not, 
in this case of specific direction, for it is, “shall communicate,” where 
stands the case against Mr. Weils, who was merely “ requested ? ” 
Again, if disqualification is, ipso facto, to attach to non-compliance 
with the regulations, then the exhibitor arriving a little late, and 
staging his exhibit just after the appointed hour, stands “disqualified,” 
and cannot take a prize. Can the Secretaries of the Society, past and 
present, state that such late staging has never taken place; or that, 
having taken place, it has been followed by disqualification ? And 
again, if not, where stands the case against Mr. Wells ? It therefore 
results that disqualification has, notwithstanding the foot-note, never 
been treated as attaching to the mere disregard of a regulation, qua 
regulation, and that we must go to the particular regulation itself to see 
whether its nature is penal enough, and its terms clear and mandatory 
enough, to require and justify the employment of disqualication; and 
thus we get back exactly to our starting point, the original question of 
the effect of the “ request.” The foot-note, in fact, does not affect the 
case at all adversely to Mr. Wells. But there is another point. 
Regulation 6 provides that “ the decision of the judges is final in regard 
to the prizes specified in the schedule.” As I understand the present 
case, the judges awarded the prize to Mr. Wells, and the Committee 
subsequently disqualified the stand. But surely they are “estopped” 
by their own regulation from doing anything of the kind. Besides, 
where in the schedule—which is the contract with the exhibitor—is 
there any power reserved to the Committee to dim’inish the powers 
contracted to be given to the judges under Regulation 6 ? 
The last point. If there is one rule of law more distinctly settled 
than another it is that in “ penal ” legislation the words of the statute 
shall be strictly construed, no expansion of their meaning, or even 
probable intention, is permitted. The penalty of “disqualification” 
is obviously “ penal.” Applying this rule of law to Regulation 8 it 
would appear that the regulation does not touch Mr. Wells’ case at 
all, for whatever was meant by the drawers of the schedule, it applies 
only to “ twelve bloom ” and “ six bloom ” stands, and leaves the 
larger stands altogether unaffected. However, this last point is 
obviously merely a technical one, and it must be a satisfaction to 
Mr. Wells to know that, upon the merits of the case, as shown by 
a fair consideration of the treatment meted out to defaulters under 
the several regulations which I have dealt with, aa well as upon the 
question of strict interpretation, the verdict must be in his favour. 
The moral of the whole matter is that far too little care is used in 
the framing of schedules, and committees loften forget that these 
documents really constitute formal contracts upon the faith of which 
