and thus affect pathogenicity or dispersion of 
pathological agents. 
Reports from the Falmouth Meeting (section IV) 
and COGENE-sponsored analyses of E. coli K-12 
systems (section VI) show that many relevant 
experiments have already been conducted by 
scientists in such closely related fields as epide¬ 
miology and infectious diseases. Their observa¬ 
tions that E. coli K-12 has a limited prospect of 
survival and their consensus that this bacterium 
cannot be converted into an epidemic pathogen 
by laboratory manipulations with DNA inserts, do 
much to satisfy the first concern mentioned above. 
In addition (section VII), long-term monitoring of 
laboratory workers who routinely handled K-12 
organisms carrying transmission-proficient plas¬ 
mids showed no bowel colonization despite the 
fact that the work was carried out without any spe¬ 
cial precautions. If the organisms which carry 
recombinant DNA cannot spread in the natural 
environment, then clearly the other concerns are 
also diminished. The conclusion of a NIH/EMBO 
Virology Workshop (section V) was that recombi¬ 
nant organisms carrying viral inserts cannot be 
more hazardous than the viruses themselves, and 
in some instances may provide an opportunity to 
work more safely with virulent agents. 
As can be seen in the report, important informa¬ 
tion on the nature and possible consequences of 
the manipulations used in recombinant DNAtech- 
nology comes from experiments in various fields. 
For example, attempts to understand the biologi¬ 
cal role of restriction enzymes have revealed that 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic DMAs can recombine 
in vivo. Other studies, including those with Agro- 
bacterium tumefaciens and plant cells, also show 
that in some cases there is no natural barrier to 
exchange and expression of genes across the 
hypothetical prokaryotic-eukaryotic barrier. On 
the other hand, studies of animal virus genomes 
and eukaryotic genes for differentiated functions 
have revealed previously unsuspected possible 
barriers to their expression in prokaryotic back¬ 
grounds. It is clear that further studies of the 
molecular genetics, pathogenicity, ecology and 
other properties of organisms will continue to pro¬ 
vide information relevant to the assessment of risk 
and that this source is no less important than spe¬ 
cifically targeted experiments. 
Replies to our Questionnaire (sections I and II) 
indicate that there are several projects currently 
underway directed specifically towards risk 
assessment. These includethetwo separate poly¬ 
oma virus experiments currently sponsored by 
EMBO and by NIFI and several NIH contracts 
aimed at testing and verification of EK2 and EK3 
systems. Preliminary results, as well as conclu¬ 
sions from the NIFI-EMBO Virology Workshop 
indicate that these studies are unlikely to reveal 
unknown hazards. These and other experiments 
which are aimed at elucidating various aspects of 
the ecology and natural history of microorganisms 
should provide useful information and will be 
important in the development of host-vector sys¬ 
tems other than those based on E. coli K-12. 
In summary, our analyses have revealed no 
scientific findings to justify any of the three con¬ 
cerns listed above: no risk unique to recombinant 
DNA research has been identified. Available evi¬ 
dence indicates that recombinations of the type 
made possible by this new technology can occur 
in Nature. Evaluation of E. co//K-12showsthatthis 
bacterium is essentially harmless and that inser¬ 
tions of segments of foreign DNA into its genome 
cannot alter this property. With few exceptions, it 
seems likely that the same will prove true of other 
host bacteria. These conclusions cannot be 
ignored if the guidelines governing recombinant 
DNA research are to remain rational and useful. 
Recombinant DNA Guidelines Report 
S.N. Cohen (USA), covenor 
G. Ada (Australia) 
A.A. Bayev (USSR) 
G. Bernardi (France) 
L. Bogorad (USA) 
P. Starlinger (FRG) 
J. Tooze (E.M.B.O.) 
The Working Group of Recombinant DNA Guide¬ 
lines was established by COGENE in May 1977 
and charged with the responsibility of 1) obtaining 
information about the status and content of 
Recombinant DNA Guidelines in different nations 
and 2) analyzing, comparing and evaluating the 
provisions of the various national guidelines and 
the premises on which these provisions are 
based. Shortly after its formation the Working 
Group prepared and circulated a short question- 
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