naire to the scientific liason for each nation 
represented in the International Council of Scien¬ 
tific Unions. A second questionnaire was distrib¬ 
uted to the appropriate scientific representative of 
each nation which had indicated that recombinant 
DMA experimentation and/or the preparation of 
guidelines governing this research was underway. 
By the time of the meeting of the Working Group 
in Pans on April 7-8, 1978, completed question¬ 
naires and/or copies of the national guidelines 
had been received from 49 countries having 
scientific societies affiliated with ICSU and the 
information provided had been tabulated by com¬ 
puter. The accumulated questionnaire data and 
the results of the Working Group's analysis and 
evaluation of the guidelines documents them¬ 
selves form the basis for this interim report. 
At the end of March 1978, at least 367 recombi¬ 
nant DNA projects were estimated to be underway 
in 1 55 laboratories in 1 5 countries. Seven of these 
were at a high level of containment, 76 were at a 
moderate level, and the remainder at a level of 
containment designated by the respondent as 
"low”. Seventeen nations had drawn up guidelines 
for recombinant DNA experimentation, and these 
were in force in 13 nations. Five of the nations had 
prepared their own guidelines, whereas the rest 
had adopted or modified guidelines of the United 
States or the United Kingdom. Of the responding 
nations that had not drafted guidelines by the time 
of the response, 13 intended to establish guide¬ 
lines, while 4 indicated no intention to establish 
guidelines. Sixteen recombinant DNA projects 
were indicated as being underway where no 
guidelines existed. 
The guidelines of 4 nations were reported as 
being entirely voluntary. Eight nations have guide¬ 
lines that are enforceable through a research 
funding mechanism, and 2 nations have legally 
enforceable guidelines. The mechanism for auth¬ 
orizing research varies in different nations: in 
some nations authorization is provided to institu¬ 
tions, whereas in others it is granted to individual 
laboratories and/or scientists. Six nations require 
specific training for researchers in this field, and 7 
offer training courses. Although the guidelines of 8 
nations indicate that the precautions required for 
recombinant DNA experimentation can be modi¬ 
fied on the basis of experience in this area of 
research, only 4 nations specify any criteria or 
mechanism for such modification. 
A full tabulation of information obtained from 
completed questionnaires will be included with the 
next report of the Working Group. 
The Working Group's analysis of the various 
national guidelines and of the questionnaire 
responses has led to the following preliminary 
conclusions: 
(1) During the past several years, guidelines 
for the conduct of recombinant DNA experiments 
have been prepared by a number of nations 
whose national scientific bodies are members of 
ICSU. Some nations carrying out recombinant 
DNA experimentation have not promulgated for¬ 
mal guidelines, and some do not inted to do so. 
(2) Guidelines of most nations have been 
derived directly or indirectly from those of the Uni¬ 
ted States, which were the first to be promulgated, 
and the assumptions implicit or explicit in the Uni¬ 
ted States guidelines have been incorporated in 
guidelines of other nations. Although fine grada¬ 
tions of risk and containment are specified in most 
national guidelines, the basis for such distinctions 
appears to be entirely conjectural. No documenta¬ 
tion to support the assumption of risk is provided in 
any of the guidelines examined. 
(3) While the guidelines of other nations have 
been generally patterned after those of the U.S., 
there are substantial differences in the various 
national guidelines. Some have the force of regu¬ 
lations, while others are considered simply as 
standard operating procedures, and their obser¬ 
vance is voluntary. Some guidelines are con¬ 
cerned only with organisms containing 
recombinant DNA molecules while others also 
pertain to the recombinant DNA itself. Some have 
employed an encyclopedic approach which 
attempts to anticipate and specify conditions for 
all possible forms of recombinant DNA experi¬ 
mentation, while others have adopted an 
approach that utilizes a case-by-case analysisfor 
determining the containment necessary for a par¬ 
ticular kind of experiment. 
(4) Identical experiments require strikingly dif¬ 
ferent levels of precautions in different nations. 
Moreover, although the general approach to bio¬ 
logical and physical containment first proposed in 
the U.S. guidelines has been adopted by most 
other nations, the specific characteristics of each 
containment level differ markedly among different 
nations. 
(5) In some nations, the guidelines specify the 
maximum level of precaution required, and a 
national committee may reduce precautions from 
this level under certain circumstances. In other 
nations, the guidelines specify the minimum level 
of precaution required, and precautions may be 
increased by the actions of local or sub-national 
bodies. 
(6) Those guidelines that have been prepared 
more recently are in general less restrictive than 
are the earlier guidelines. This appears to reflect a 
changing assessment of the risk of recombinant 
DNA experiments as greater experience in this 
area of research has accumulated. However, the 
guidelines of most nations do not have a time lim- 
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