232 REVIEW-GLEANINGS IN NATURAL HISTORY. 
that some of them are endowed with a faculty which does not 
come under the usual notions of instinct, by whatever other name 
we may choose to call it, will, 1 think, hardly allow of a dispute. 
This, as it strikes me, appears in the different degrees of intelli¬ 
gence which we are accustomed to recognize as elevating one 
species of animal above another—as the half-reasoning elephant, 
for instance ; and the friend of man, the dog, above numberless 
others. Now, instinct of one tribe, one would think, as much as 
in another, must be full and perfect, and would not admit of our 
considering the degree of intelligence manifested in one species 
as higher or lower than that possessed by another. Again; much 
more must we conceive that the proper instinct of any species 
will be fully, and therefore equally, possessed by all individuals 
of that species. How then, upon the notion of mere instinct, 
shall we account for that superiority of intelligence which is 
found in one individual to others of the same species, and w hich 
is familiar to those who are employed about or in any way in the 
habit of conversing with animals ? But the observation which 
appears to me most decidedly to carry the faculties of animals 
to something exceeding the measure and character of instinct, 
is that of the new and ingenious contrivances to which they will 
often have recourse in situations, and upon occasions, much 
too accidental and peculiar to admit of our imagining that they 
could have been contemplated and provided against in the 
regular instinct of the whole species. This we should naturally 
be disposed to conceive must have been given to regulate the 
ordinary habits of the animals, and adapted to those exigencies 
of their mode of life which are continually occurring; not to such 
as do rarely,and might, one would be tempted to say, never occur.” 
Our space will not admit of inserting the different instances 
which the ingenious author has adduced to support his position ; 
the following, however, will be sufficient to explain what he 
means :— 
“ I was one day feeding the poor elephant (who was so bar¬ 
barously put to death at Exeter Change) with potatoes, which 
he took out of my hand. One of them, a round one, fell on the 
floor, just out of the reach of his proboscis. \ He leaped against 
his wooden bar, put out his trunk, and cotild just touch the 
potatoe, but could not pick it up. After several ineffectual 
efforts, he at last blew the potatoe against the opposite wall 
with sufficient force to make it rebound, and he then, without 
difficulty, secured it. Now it is quite clear, I think, that instinct 
never taught the elephant to procure his food in this manner; and 
it must, therefore, have been reason or some intellectual faculty 
which enabled him to be so good a judge of cause and effect. 
Indeed, the reflecting power of some animals is quite extra- 
