SOUNDNESS IN HORSES. 
457 
be meant, by such a warrantry ? Before I venture to answer this 
important question, I conceive it will be prudent to take a view 
of it in another shape; for it is a question pregnant with matter, 
and surrounded with difficulties. Would it not, therefoie, be ad¬ 
visable for us, first, to inquire what are the causes of unsoundness 
in constitution ? 
The first and principal one appears to be disease. 
And now another question arises—What do we mean by 
disease^ 
Extraordinary as it may seem, to give definitions of health and 
disease has proved a most perplexing task to philosophers, both 
natural and medical. Their endless researches aftei positive cha¬ 
racteristics have only gone to show us that these states are, in 
reality, but relative in their existence; and every day’s experience 
proves to us, that what may turn out to the philosopher to be very 
difficult to define, may, as plain matter of fact, prove to be as well 
known and understood by the peasant as by himself. From which 
I must argue, that for practical purposes we stand in no need of 
a definition: and even supposing we did, still we had better con¬ 
tinue without one, than adopt that which would in any instance 
lead us astray. To my surprise (as if that which in medicine proved 
almost impossible to the physician to define, would turn out easy 
of solution to the lawyer) the law has in a most aibitrary and un¬ 
just manner stepped in here: it runs thus -“When the defect 
arises from a temporary injury capable of being speedily cured, 
and not interfering with such enjoyment (that of i present use and 
convenience’), the horse is not on that account to be held un¬ 
sound.” Taking the word defect to be used here synonimously 
with disease, who, I should like to know, is to determine, in many 
cases, when disorder “ arises from a temporary injury ,” and when 
it is “capable of being speedily cured,” and when it can or ought 
to be allowed to “ interfere with enjoyment ?” All this may appear 
very plausible in a court of law j but to the medical philosopher it 
is reasoning of a most loose and indefinite chaiactei , and can no 
more serve as a line of direction to him, than a woik on anatomy 
could have enlightened the lawyer who framed such a law. 
Respecting the state of recognized or actual disease, there can¬ 
not be two opinions: but it is the period at which health is merging 
into disease, or disease into health—when the lattei exists only in 
its invisible or inactive form—when its seeds or productions alone 
become discoverable—I say, then it is that we begin to wavei in 
our judgment and differ in our opinion. To those who seek our 
advice on these points, as common observers and men possessing 
general information, it must seem strange—perhaps on some occa¬ 
sions even dishonest—that wc should thus disagree among ourselves: 
