246 ON THE REASONING FACULTIES OF ANIMALS. 
of one proposition from another,” and Locke explains it in almost 
similar terms. 
If these definitions be correct—and they have never been dis¬ 
puted—all we have to do is, to bring the actions of animals to the 
test afforded by these great authorities. Many remarkable facts 
are related in support of the possession of reason by animals; but 
let us take one of the simplest acts,—a common and eve'ry-day 
occurrence. 
Two persons, A and B, enter a friend’s house where there is a 
dog. A, being fond of animals, caresses and plays with the poor 
brute; but B, with a severe kick, sends him howling out of the 
room. The following day the friends enter the same habitation, 
when the dog runs forward eagerly to meet the one who used him 
well, but avoids, with fear and dislike, him who so badly treated 
him. Now, what faculties are sufficient to account for this con¬ 
duct in the dog 1 He must have memory to bring before his mind 
the event of the previous day : but here simple recollection will 
stop; it will cause no overt act. But the animal associates with 
the presence of A the kind treatment he before experienced, and 
with B the barbarous usage he received. 
Here we have association of ideas; but even this is not enough 
to prompt the act of the animal, unless we allow that he infers, 
from the previous kindness of the one, that he shall again receive 
good treatment, and from the conduct of the other, that he shall 
again be in danger of a kick. Here we have clearly an inference 
drawn by the dog,—A patted me yesterday, he will therefore do 
so again to day; whilst B gave me a kick, and, if I don’t take care, 
he will soon give me another.” Here is a clear though simple pro¬ 
cess of reason; and in no other way can we account for the conduct 
of the dog. I prefer resting the argument on this ordinary occur¬ 
rence, rather than on any extraordinary facts that have been related; 
but I cannot forbear relating a singular anecdote in reference to a 
horse, that bears very strongly on the point in question. 
In the summer of 1838, a horse was seen at the door of my forge 
without halter or attendant, and he was accordingly driven away 
by my men, who observed that he moved very lame. The animal, 
however, returned shortly afterwards, and was again driven away. 
He returned a third time, holding up his lame foot. The men, 
partly from whim and partly from pity, examined his foot, and found 
that he had lost a shoe, and worn the horn so much, that it made 
him lame; they therefore nailed on an old shoe, let the horse go, 
and he never returned afterwards. What makes the circumstance 
more strange is, that the men had no recollection of having seen the 
horse before. He had, however, no doubt, been turned out on the 
neighbouring common, where he had lost a shoe : in his lame state 
