ON ORGANIC AND ANIMAL LIFE. 133 
It can hardly be requisite to state at the commencement, that 
the nature of the living principle is among the subjects which 
are considered to be beyond the reach of human ken. By 
some, the vital principle is compared to magnetism, to electri¬ 
city, and to galvanism, or it is roundly stated to be oxygen. 
“ Tis like a camel, or a whale, or like what you please.^’ 
Without considering the different hypotheses that have been 
formed on this subject, for it has proved a very fruitful field for 
conjecture, we will state the opinions of Bichat on the theory 
of life. This eloquent and philosophic writer considered it 
** as a collection of matter, gifted for a time with certain powers 
of action combined with organs, which are thus enabled to act; 
and the result is a series of functions, the connected perform¬ 
ance of which constitutes a living thing.” 
This writer has pointed out two remarkable modifications of 
life, as viewed in different relations : one common both to ve¬ 
getables and animals, the other peculiar to animals. The ve¬ 
getable exists entirely wdthin itself, and for itself, depending 
upon other substances only for the materials of nutrition. The 
animal, on the contrary, in addition to the internal life, has 
another, by which he connects himself with objects about him, 
maintains relations with them, and is bound to them by the ties 
of mutual dependence. This afforded a principle upon which 
to form a distinct classification of the animal functions. Those 
which animals have in common with vegetables, which are 
necessary merely to individual bodily existence, are called the 
functio7is of organic life, because they are common to all organ¬ 
ized matter. Those, on the other hand, which are peculiar to 
animals, and which in them are superadded to the possession of 
the organic functions, are called the functions of animal life. 
By this division into organic and animal life, animals have 
two lives, the concurrence of which enables them to live and 
move, and have their being—both equally necessary to the re¬ 
lations they maintain as living beings, but not equally necessary 
to the simple existence of a living thing. 
By their animal life they become related to the world about 
them : their senses convey to them a knowledge of the existence 
of other things besides themselves ; a knowdedge also of their 
qualities and their capacities for producing pleasure and pain ; for 
they feel, they reflect, they judge, they will, and react upon ex¬ 
ternal things by means of the organs of locomotion and voice; 
and, according to the result of their mental operations, they be¬ 
come capable of communicating and receiving pleasure and pain, 
happiness and misery. Animals, when individuals interfere, 
or associate with one another, ever have some pow'er of expres- 
