VETERINARY JURISPRUDENCE. 
273 
Fraud. 
“ III order to set aside a bargain for horses (or indeed any thing 
else), any fraud or deception practised at the time of sale will 
avoid the contract; and it is not absolutely necessary that the 
horse should be unsound, so as to constitute a breach of the 
warranty, in order to annul a bargain w'here fraud has been 
practised.’’ 
But if a man will not use his endeavours to protect his own 
interest, the law will not take cognizance of the impositions which 
may be practised upon him owing to his negligence.” 
Vigilantibus non dorniientibus jura snbscrviunt. 
‘‘ I remember a case of deception, which I think was brought 
before one of the police offices: 1 merely mention it to shew 
the impositions some people attempt to practise in the sale of 
horses. 
It appeared that a quaker had a horse for sale, which, like 
many others, w^as ‘ the best in England and meeting with a 
customer who wanted a gig horse, he of course recommended his 
own. 
“ The purchaser inquired if he was quiet in harness ; to which 
the quaker replied—‘ Friend, it would delight thine eyes to see 
him draw :’ wdiereupon he purchased him, and immediately put 
him into a gig, which he broke all to pieces. 
‘‘The purchaser remonstrated with the quaker, and told him 
that he had warranted the horse to go ‘ quiet in harness;’ upon 
which the quaker replied, ‘ No, friend, I did not: I merely said 
that it w-ould delight thine eyes to see him draw; and faith so it 
would mine too, for he never w^ould bear a pair of shafts in his 
life.’ ” 
Trial. 
Trial,” says the law book, means a reasonable trial.” 
Judge Blackstone says that, ‘ a warranty can only reach to 
things in being at the time of the warranty being made, and not 
to in futnr 0 —as, that a horse is sound at the buying of 
him, and not that he will be sound two years hence.’ 
This doctrine has been doubted; and Lord Mansfield de¬ 
clared, in a case where the above opinion was quoted, ^ that 
there is no doubt but you may warrant a future event.’ ” 
We need not pursue our extracts further: they suffice to 
shew the nature and drift of the work before us, as well as to 
evince how little our learned legal heads yet know about horse 
concerns. P. 
