7 
Mr. Mitchell said chapter four concludes that currently no governmental 
agency has adequate oversight of ethical and social issues. The Commission 
supports a continuing oversight process with substantial federal government 
involvement and coordination among agencies, with 9ome involvement of the 
private sector. The report offers a number of specific suggestions as to 
the constitution of an oversight group and the functions the group should 
perform. The group should: (1) educate the scientific ccmmunity to be 
fully aware of the social and ethical implications of scientific activity 
and educate the general public in the science; (2) provide general oversight 
and leadership as well as direct liaison with other agencies; (3) serve as 
an intermediary between the biomedical and scientific community and the 
public; (4) operate on a scientifically sound basis; (5) treat genetic 
engineering in as unified a framework as possible; and (6) be separated from 
any sponsoring functions so that no conflicts of interest will occur. 
Mr. Mitchell said "Splicing Life" commented on the RAC and its activities. 
He said the report recognizes RAC's contribution and success, and acknow- 
ledges that certain benefits would be gained from building on the history 
of the RAC. The report also alludes to comments by former NIH Director, 
Cbnald Fredrickson, concerning his suggestion that there be a third genera- 
tion RAC, i.e., representing a broader community. 
Mr. Mitchell then commented on the recommendations of the report, "Splicing 
Life." He felt oversight responsibilities should reside in one group. One 
single oversight group would provide an opportunity for a ccmplete interchange 
of ideas. Mr. Mitchell said the report implies that persons having a human- 
ities background may be better able to identify and resolve social and 
ethical issues. He felt, however, that the group should have some members 
with pragmatic scientific experience since genetic engineering is grounded 
in technology. Tb avoid political influences, the group should retain a 
degree of independence, yet have access to key decision makers. 
Dr. Harris endorsed the concept that one group should provide oversight. 
She noted that RAC, if it were to become the oversight body for human 
genetic engineering, would be transformed. Issues beyond the laboratory 
biohazards RAC considers its primary focus would have to be considered. 
Dr. Harris said there are several advantages for RAC assuming this additional 
responsibility. She expressed reservations about severing an oversight 
body for human genetic engineering from the scientific ccmmunity and frcm 
the NIH which not only functions as a planning and implementing component 
but also as an interpreter to the community at large. Moreover, RAC has 
a history of responsibility in considering the public good as it relates 
to biohazards in biotechnology and has a record of unbiased, dispassionate 
review. 
Dr. Saginor also endorsed the concept of having a single oversight group. 
Dr. Nightingale said the ethical concerns associated with genetic engineer- 
ing are quite different frcm biosafety concerns. She said ethical concerns 
include that the well-being of all individuals be promoted, that people's 
value choices and preferences be respected, and that people be treated 
equitably. 
[ 92 ] 
