Attachment II - Page 6 
November 1983 
A misuse of bioengineering technology for military -purposes seems 
probable unless a reexamination of and a stronger commitment to 
biological weapons disarmament is forthcoming. 
Recombinant DNA and biological warfare 
by Susan Wright 
and Robert L. Sinsheimer 
O NCE AGAIN WE CONFRONT the age-old problem: 
Can we prevent the misuse of human knowledge for 
evil purpose? Can we forestall the perversion of human in- 
genuity to the depravity of war? Archimedes used his 
knowledge of mechanics to design catapults. Leonardo ap- 
plied his genius to the invention of engines of war. The sci- 
entists of Los Alamos developed the atomic bomb. Is the 
new synthetic biology likewise to be the source of new and 
dreadful weapons? 
Deliberate construction of harmful biological agents has 
generally been acknowledged as the most extreme biohaz- 
ard associated with recombinant DNA technology. The 
possibility of military use has always been in the back- 
ground of the controversy surrounding its development 
and application. The problem was raised, for example, in 
a Neur Scientist editorial in 1973: 
DNA hybridization must also look an attractive propo- 
sition for biological warfare researchers (who are, of 
course, still about their business, despite recent gestures 
towards biological disarmament). The new technique 
offers the prospect of fabricating ever nastier BW [biolo- 
gical warfare] agents, facilitating the combination of 
“desirable characteristics” that cannot be brought to- 
gether by conventional microbial genetics.' 
In 1974, the same possibility was raised by reporters at 
the press conference at which members of the U.S. Nation- 
al Academy of Sciences Committee on Recombinant DNA 
Molecules announced the embargo on certain lines of re- 
search. The response was that military applications were 
“a challenge we’re going to have to meet when we know it 
exists.” 2 Furthermore, the controversy in 1975-1978 about 
appropriate controls for recombinant DNA technology 
raised the point that no laboratory safety measures, how- 
ever stringent, would reduce the risks of deliberate produc- 
tion of harmful agents. As the Federation of American Sci- 
entists Public Interest Report stated in April 1976: 
Susan Wright teaches the history of science at 
the Residential College of the University of 
Michigan in Ann Arbor (48109). She is com- 
pleting a study of recombinant DNA technology 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Few doubt that this technology has the potential for 
deliberate misuse to produce great dangers. Genes from 
disease-causing [pathogenic] organisms, or from organ- 
isms that produce highly toxic agents, could be implant- 
ed in hosts capable of rapid spread, so as to produce 
dramatic new biological dangers. . . . The world must 
begin to face a biological proliferation threat that might, 
before long, rival that of nuclear weapons. 2 
Private and public organizations which have subse- 
quently examined the hazards of recombinant DNA tech- 
nology have tended to ignore this issue. The public health 
hazards of research were, from the beginning, the focus of 
formal agendas; other issues were set aside. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the first government-appointed 
committee to address the question of safeguards for recom- 
binant DNA technology dismissed the problem of possible 
military uses becauses it fell outside the committee’s 
charge. 4 At the crucial international meeting of molecular 
biologists held in 1975 at Asiiomar, California, one of the 
organizers stated at the outset that the issue, while impor- 
tant, did not belong on the conference agenda. 5 As pros- 
pects of profitable industrial applications of recombinant 
DNA techniques glitter more brightly, the entire ques- 
tion of potential hazards of the Field, including socially-in- 
duced hazards, is fading into the background of social con- 
cerns, both for the general public and for the scientific 
community. 
One REASON FOR NEGLECT of the biological 
warfare issue is that production and stockpiling of harmful 
biological agents as weapons for use against people, other 
animals or crops are prohibited under the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 1972.* Roughly half the nations 
of the world, including the United States and the Soviet 
Union, are parties to this treaty. The preamble to this Con- 
vention states the determination of signatories to “exclude 
completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) 
agents and toxins being used as weapons.” Under Article I, 
signatory nations pledge never to produce “microbial or 
other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their method 
of production, of types or in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes." Under Article II, parties undertake to destroy 
all stockpiles of biological agents and toxins. Under Article 
X, parties agree to facilitate “the fullest possible exchange" 
of equipment, materials, and information regarding use of 
biological agents and toxins for “peaceful purposes." 
U.S. government representatives have repeatedly stated 
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