Attachment II - Page 7 
that deliberate construction of novel, harmful organisms 
for weapons purposes is barred by the Convention. 7 In 
August 1976 Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. made a de- 
tailed statement to the U.N. Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament: 
On August 5, 1970, the distinguished biologist, Dr. 
Joshua Lederberg, pointed out to the CCD the advances 
being made in molecular biology, and expressed his con- 
cern that newly-developed techniques in this field might 
eventually be used to create infective agents against 
which no credible defense is possible. The most widely- 
discussed techniques are often referred to as “genetic en- 
gineering,” but technically are properly known as “re- 
combinant DNA techniques." These are techniques for 
joining two different pieces of DNA in the laboratory 
to produce new DNA sequences, known as recombi- 
nant DNA molecules. In principle, such techniques 
could be used to design radically new viruses for bio- 
logical warfare purposes. 
When advances in science and technology arc made, 
it is natural to ask about their possible use for hostile 
purposes, and whether or not such uses are prohibited 
or restricted by existing international agreements. In the 
case of potential use of recombinant DNA molecules for 
weapons purposes, it is our view that such use clearly 
falls within the scope of the Convention s prohibition. 
This interpretation is based upon the negotiating history 
as well as the explicit language of the Convention, and 
we believe that it is shared by the other signatories.' 
This interpretation was further confirmed at the First 
Review Conference of the parties to the Convention, held 
in Geneva in March 1980. The meeting was held to assure 
that the treaty’s purposes were being realized and to con- 
sider the relevance of any new scientific and technological 
developments. 
A briefing paper prepared by the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the United States considered the de- 
velopment of fundamentally new, dangerous microorgan- 
isms or toxins to be a task of “insurmountable com- 
plexity.” It argued further that since “naturally-occurring 
disease-producing microorganisms and toxins already span 
an exceedingly broad range, from some which are extraor- 
dinarily deadly to others usually producing only temporary 
illness,” there would be little motivation for the invention 
of wholly novel organisms for weapons purposes. New 
technologies of genetic manipulation could, the report re- 
cognized, enhance military utility of existing pathogens or 
toxins, but these new agents were unlikely to provide 
“compelling advantages” for military use in the foreseeable 
future. The report concluded that the Convention’s lan- 
guage “fully covered” all agents which could result from 
recombinant DNA or other new techniques of genetic 
manipulation.’ 
These views were accepted virtually intact by represen- 
tatives of nations participating in the Review Conference. 
They concluded that new “scientific and technological de- 
velopments, including those in the area of genetic engineer- 
ing .. . did not jeopardize the coverage of the 
Convention.” 10 
Until April 1980, the U.S. Department of Defense had 
stated that it was not sponsoring, and did not plan to carry 
out, recombinant DNA research, although the possibility 
of such work in the future was not ruled out. 11 Little 
reference to such research appeared in the Department s 
annual reports to Congress on the U.S. Chemical Warfare 
and Biological Defense Research Programs for fiscal years 
1977, 1978 and 1979. 12 
Thus concerns about possible military use of new bio- 
technologies seemed largely speculative. Since 1980, how- 
ever, two developments have revived the question of dan- 
gerous applications: 
• The progressive weakening of national guidelines for 
recombinant DNA research in recent years has made it per- 
missible to perform experiments previously prohibited be- 
cause they were judged to be of extreme hazard. The Na- 
tional Institutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee and two of the Institutes’ safety committees re- 
cently approved a proposal to insert the diphtheria toxin 
gene into the common £. coli bacterium. 13 For these com- 
mittees, the central consideration was whether the experi- 
ment could be done safely. Broader issues -whether there 
were good reasons for doing the experiment, whether it 
complies with the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
social consequences of setting a precedent for construction 
of novel pathogens, and how such work might be inter- 
preted by other nations- received little or no attention. 14 
Yet clearly, it is just such uses that have high potential for 
weapons applications and require broad review, based on 
social consequences. 
The rationale for the work is medical — the development 
of a new cancer therapy. 15 But some scientists have ques- 
tioned the necessity for the experiment on the grounds that 
the information likely to be gained could be obtained in 
other, safer ways. 14 If their arguments are correct, then the 
experiment indeed has “no justification for peaceful 
purposes. 
• New military interests in biological research in gener- 
al, and in recombinant DNA technology in particular, 
have emerged over the last few years. Defense Department 
support for biological research has increased significantly; 
defense obligations for all biological research and for 
biological research in the universities increased in real 
terms by 15 percent and 24 percent respectively from fiscal 
1980 to 1982. Moreover, funding for biological research 
by the National Institutes of Health -which represented 
80 percent of the U.S. total in fiscal 1982, compared to the 
Defense Department’s 1.5 percent -declined in the same 
Robert L. Sinsheimer, a biophysicist, is chan- 
^ A ] cellor of the University of California at Santa 
y j Cruz (95064 . 
[297] 
