Attachment II - Page 8 
period. The corresponding changes were -4.1 percent and 
-3.6 percent, respectively. 17 Research biologists will prob- 
ably feel pressure to seek support from military sources. 
The CURRENT DEFENSE DEPARTMENT biolo- 
gical research program does not neglect military implica- 
tions of recombinant DNA technology. From 1975, when 
the United States ratified the Biological Weapons Conven- 
tion, until 1980, the Department’s biological research pro- 
gram, as reported to Congress, was largely devoted to de- 
fenses against lethal pathogens such as anthrax, botuli- 
nus and Lassa fever virus, which it assumed might be used 
as weapons. Medical defenses against organisms likely 
to be encountered by troops in combat areas were also 
developed. 11 
With the emergence of recombinant DNA technology, 
however, it was recognized that the new techniques might 
be applied for a variety of military purposes, such as devel- 
opment of vaccines, production of large quantities of sub- 
stances which the Defense Department had a special inter- 
est in studying, and control of deterioration of supplies 
and equipment. Expansion of work in these areas is an- 
ticipated, and the Army, Navy and Air Force are expected 
to have active recombinant DNA research programs in 
1983. 
Since 1980, some 15 projects involving recombinant 
DNA methods have been initiated in Defense facilities, 
universities and private laboratories (see insen). In Septem- 
ber 1980, the U.S. Army Medical Research and Develop- 
ment Command solicited proposals for the introduction of 
the gene for acetylcholinesterase (a neural transmitter at- 
tacked by nerve gas) into a bacterium. The purpose was to 
use the bacterium to synthesize the enzyme so as to study 
its action in the nervous system. According to a phone con- 
versation with Dr. William Beisel, deputy for research at 
the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious 
Diseases, the problem was judged sufficiently important 
for six groups to approach it independently and “essential- 
ly compete with each other.” 
Six further Defense-sponsored projects focus on the 
cloning of genes of various disease-causing agents for the 
making of vaccines. Two other projects involve the bacter- 
ial synthesis of a determinant of a squid enzyme capable of 
detoxifying nerve gases and research into the molecular 
biology of marine bio-fouling, aimed at the control of 
slime molds that foul the bottoms of ships. All of these 
projects are unclassified, but certain results of the Defense 
Department program for development of physical appara- 
tus for detection of, and protection against, biological 
agents are classified. 1 ’ 
The Defense Department has also recognized that re- 
combinant DNA technology and other new forms of gene- 
tic manipulation could present a new range of military 
problems because of their potential to enhance such factors 
as the selectivity, lethality and stability of microorganisms. 
The Department’s reports on the biological research pro- 
grams for fiscal 1980 and 1981 characterized this possibili- 
ty as a “new” threat: 
Important questions concerning medical defense against 
BW [biological warfare) attacks are not presently con- 
tamed in official guidance. New threats may be opened 
up by various technological and scientific advances. As 
examples, recombinant DNA technology could make it 
possible for a potential enemy to implant virulence fac- 
tors or toxin-producing genetic information into com- 
mon, easily-transmitted bacteria such as E. co/i. 2# 
In response to this possibility Defense contemplates new 
research with the objective of providing “an essential base 
of scientific information to counteract these possibilities 
and to provide a better understanding of the disease 
mechanisms of bacteria! and rickettsial organisms that 
pose a potential BW threat, with or without genetic 
manipulation.” 21 Thus, Department planners apparently 
contemplate using recombinant DNA techniques to change 
or accentuate the properties of disease-causing organisms. 
For how else could a “base of scientific information” and a 
“better understanding” of such organisms be derived? 
Defense officials state that no work of this kind is now in 
progress. They recognize the obvious problem implied in 
the departmental reports— that disease-causing organisms 
could be manipulated almost infinitely, and that it would 
be extremely difficult to develop a defense without know- 
ing precisely what changes had been wrought. On the 
other hand, they recognize that two contingencies might 
make work in this area more feasible: intelligence informa- 
tion could provide details of an organism likely to be used, 
or a scientific advance might make it feasible to develop a 
general defense against a class of genetically-engineered or- 
ganisms. Colonel Philip Winter, military assistant for med- 
ical and life sciences in the Defense Department’s Office of 
the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering, stated in 
an interview on September 1, 1981: 
I think myself that that’s a problem we cannot yet ap- 
proach. ... If one is going to develop a defense against 
such a hypothetical organism, one would have to know 
pretty well what the organism was. There’s an almost 
infinite variety . . . unless we have some intelligence 
information that says fairly specifically what kind of 
threat we’re facing, there’s not much we can do about 
developing a defense system. Barring some advance in 
knowledge that enables us to develop some general type 
of defense that doesn’t depend on a specific organism. 
The Department of Defense has also anticipated that 
recombinant DNA technology might be applied for the 
production of toxins (harmful substances made by living 
things) or other toxic agents. The techniques might be 
used, for example, to generate microorganisms producing 
various animal toxins, or to provide modified forms of 
well-known toxic microbial agents. A 1981 report com- 
missioned by the Department concludes that toxins “could 
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