Attachment II - Page 9 
probably be manufactured by newly-created bacterial 
strains under controlled laboratory conditions.” 22 Accord- 
ing to Tom Dashiell of the Defense Department, in a Sep- 
tember 30, 1982 interview, no such work is in progress. 
To provide detailed perspectives on these and other 
weapons issues the Department, in 1982, requested the 
National Academy of Sciences to undertake studies on de- 
fenses against certain types of chemical and biological 
weapons. 23 Defense against biological weapons construct- 
ed with the use of recombinant DNA technology was one 
of the topics for investigation. Some of this work was to be 
classified. The request was referred to the National Acade- 
my’s Commission on Life Sciences, which recommended 
against studies involving either classified materials or biol- 
ogical weapons, but approved an unclassified study 
on myco-toxins — toxins produced by fungi. (These sub- 
stances were classified as chemical agents by the 
Academy.) The recommendations were accepted by the 
National Research Council, the executive arm of the Aca-r 
demy, and the myco-toxins study is now in progress. 24 
Responding to uneasiness about the military’s intentions 
in using recombinant DNA as well as other new biotechno- 
logies, U.S. government officials have continued to affirm 
their earlier position: that the nation will not engage in any 
research aimed at the construction of biological weapons, 
and to emphasize that the Defense Department’s biological 
research program fully complies with the terms of the 
Biological Weapons Convention. According to James L. 
George, assistant director for Multinational Affairs for the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S. 
program in biological defense “does not, and will not, in- 
volve research to create and screen ‘new’ organisms as po- 
tential biological warfare agents. Our research is, and will 
continue to be, limited to developing protective measures 
to recognized infectious diseases which pose a biological 
warfare hazard.” 25 
Since none of the current research funded by the Defense 
Department is designed to produce novel biological weap- 
ons, the U.S. is officially complying with the Biological 
Weapons Convention. Yet the kinds and extent of the De- 
partment’s biological research — particularly the types 
contemplated as a response to threat of enemy use of 
genetic manipulation techniques — may raise doubts that 
such work will or can be completely in accord with the 
spirit of the Convention. 
A MAJOR STRENGTH of the Convention is its pro- 
hibition of the development, production and stockpiling of 
quantities of dangerous organisms and toxins as biological 
weapons. It is the only international treaty in modern times 
to include actual disarmament measures: signatory nations 
are required to destroy stores of toxic agents. 26 The scope 
of the treaty, however, including its coverage of novel 
agents, depends critically on the interpretation of certain 
key phrases. 
The treaty language, specifically the phrase “whatever 
their method of production," would seem to cover the 
Department of Defense 
Recombinant DNA Research Projects 
Work Done in In-house Laboratories 
• Dr. G. Knudson and Dr. M. Vodkin at U.S. Army Medi- 
cal Research Institute of Infectious Diseases: cloning of protec- 
tive antigen genes of Bacillus anthracis for vaccine usage. 
• Dr. J. G. Olenick at Walter Reed Army Institute of Re- 
search: cloning of variant-specific glycoprotein gene of African 
trypanosomes for vaccine usage. 
• Dr. D. Kopecko at Walter Reed Army Institute of Re- 
search: cloning of cell-wall genes of Rickettsia conorii for vac- 
cine usage. 
• Dr. G.A. Dasch and Dr. M.D. Dobson at Naval Medical 
Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland: cloning of rickettsial 
antigen genes for vaccine usage. 
Work Done Via Contract 
• Dr. M.I. Simon at University of California, San Diego: 
molecular basis of marine biofouling (U.S. Navy). 
• Dr. J.S. Salstrom, Dr. F. Pass and Dr. A.J. Faras at Mole- 
cular Genetics, Inc., Minnetonka, Minnesota: cloning of 
M-segment antigen gene of Rift Valley fever virus for vaccine 
development. 
• Dr. H.V. Aposhian at University of Arizona. 
• Dr. R.H. Singer at University of Massachusetts. 
• Dr. J.D. Baxter at University of California, San Francisco. 
• Dr. J.W. Patrick at Salk Institute, San Diego. 
• Dr. H. Soreq at Weizman Institute, Israel. 
• Dr. T.L. Roscnberry at Case Western Reserve, Ohio. 
This and the five immediately preceding projects all involve 
cloning of acetylcholinesterase gene for study and possible 
therapy. 
• Dr. R.K. Padmanabhan at University of Kansas: cloning 
of dengue-2 virus surface protein gene for vaccine develop- 
ment. 
• Dr. F.C.G. Hoskin and Dr. D.J. Cork at Illinois Institute 
of Technology, Chicago: cloning of squid gene for the enzyme 
diisopropyl phosphorofluoridc hydrolase (DFPasc), for 
organophosphorus detoxication. 
newer techniques of biology and thus prevent their use. 
But the treaty as written provides potential loopholes. / » 
the enhanced capabilities made possible by the new tcc 
nology may well provide the incentive to make use of t oc 
loopholes. . 
The Convention docs not prohibit research. 27 h 'P 4,1 ' 
of “quantities [not otherwise defined] that have no justi i 
cation," and it specifically permits production for p ro P > 
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