Attachment II - Page 10 
lactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.” The U.S. 
Secretary of State noted in a report to the Senate in 1972: 
“Article I provides that biological agents and toxins justi- 
fied for purposes covered by the terms ‘prophylactic’ and 
‘protective’ are not prohibited by this Convention.” u Labo- 
ratory quantities of certain agents and toxins,” he con- 
tinued, “might well be required for research and testing 
[for defense purposes].” 2 ' 
“Protective” is understood not to include “deterrent”; 
that is, a nation could not stockpile an agent under the 
“protective” clause, as a potential deterrent to a presumed 
enemy. However, “protection” certainly could permit the 
production of an agent in quantity sufficient to allow wide- 
scale immunization. “Protection” would permit the study 
of means of dissemination of an agent in order to devise 
means to counter its natural or artificial dissemination. 
The United States has, in fact, construed “protective" 
broadly. As former National Security Advisor Henry Kis- 
singer interpreted President Nixon’s announcement of the 
unilateral renunciation of biological weapons by the 
United States in 1969: 
The United States bacteriological/biological programs 
will be confined to research and development for defen- 
sive purposes (immunizations, safety measures, et cete- 
ra). This docs not preclude research into those offensive 
aspects of bacteriological/biological agents necessary to 
determine what defensive measures are required. 2 ' 
As reported in the New York Times on October 19 and 
20, 1975, a similar position was expressed by the U.S. Ar- 
my in October 1975, after ratification of the Biological 
Weapons Convention by the United States earlier that 
year. 
The operative criterion for permissible research thus 
concerns not the product of research, but rather the motive 
of the nation-state pursuing research. As molecular biolog- 
ist David Baltimore has stated: 
It is my understanding that any form of basic research, 
even if it deals with things that might have a weapons 
implication, is allowed. . . . One can, I guess, do any- 
thing for research purposes, as long as it is not some- 
thing designed to produce biological weapons. 10 
The properties of the organisms or substances that 
might emerge are not critical for deciding what might be 
permitted. 
In practice, the distinction between “peaceful” research 
and “biological weapons” research could quietly disap- 
pear; either could result in the construction of dangerous 
organisms or products. 
The new biology might well permit the development of 
agents with novel immunological characteristics, as well as 
agents more resistant to dessication or solar radiation, or 
capable of transmission by unusual vectors. Thus, it might 
seem only prudent to seek to anticipate these characteris- 
tics by one’s own research, so as to be prepared to protect 
against them. 
The logic is clear, insidious and all too familiar. 
A further problem concerns possible use of recombinant 
DNA technology for production of toxins or other toxic 
substances. While naturally-occurring toxins are prohibit- 
ed by the Convention, no matter how they arc made, it is 
not clear that this prohibition would apply to modified 
toxins produced either by chemical means or in vitro by 
enzymes made available in quantity by recombinant DNA 
techniques. If these substances were defined as chemicals, 
they would be made under the chemical warfare program 
and the processes could be classified. 31 Conceivably, then, 
use of recombinant DNA technology for such purposes 
could proceed without public scrutiny. 
In addition, the Convention may not be legally binding 
for private organizations within a signatory nation’s 
boundaries, unless this nation incorporates the provisions 
of the Convention into its domestic law. Several nations 
have taken this step, but many, including the United 
States, have yet to do so. 32 
Finally, the Convention makes no provision for manda- 
tory verification of compliance with its terms. Although 
Article X encourages the exchange of “equipment, mate- 
rials, and scientific and technological information ... for 
peaceful purposes," such sharing takes place on a purely 
selective, and voluntary, basis. The United States, for 
example, does not make public certain results of its 
Biological Defense Research Program. 
The need for verification of compliance was brought up 
by the Swedish representative at the Review Conference on 
the Convention held in March 1980, and reiterated by re- 
presentatives of many other — largely nonaligned and neu- 
tral-countries. 33 More recently, these concerns were re- 
flected in a U.N. resolution calling for a conference to dis- 
cuss verification and compliance issues. 34 Clearly, some of 
the biological research conducted under Defense Depart- 
ment auspices would be unnecessary if the Convention 
were being complied with verifiably in other nations. 
No action to amend the Convention has been taken, 
however. 
The PRESENT SITUATION may be likened to that 
of the field of nuclear weapons in the late 1940s. Tentative 
efforts were put forth at that time to seek to prevent a 
nuclear arms race, with all its perilous consequences. 
Those efforts failed, and we live in the deepening shadow 
of that failure. 
The use of the accumulated knowledge of biology for 
the construction of deadly pestilence is an ultimate perver- 
sion. Yet, unless we renounce the logic of protection and 
counterprotection, as exemplified in nuclear weaponry, it 
is a most likely development. In a climate of deepening sus- 
picion and deteriorating international relations, the sooth- 
ing conclusions of the U.N. Review Conference could easi- 
ly be invalidated by new weapons and temptations to use 
[300] 
