Attachment II - Page 11 
them. Indeed, the present bitter dispute over the alleged 
use of toxin and chemical weapons in Kampuchea, Laos 
and Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and its allies has 
helped to generate a climate in which it is acceptable 
to press for escalation of the chemical arms race and 
even to imply withdrawal from the Biological Weapons 
Convention . iS 
Several measures should be taken immediately to pre- 
vent weapons applications of the new biology, and to en- 
sure their exclusive direction for peaceful purposes. The 
United States should incorporate the Biological Weapons 
Convention into its domestic law; all nations should re- 
nounce secret biological research. 
Beyond these steps, the emergence of the new biology re- 
quires that the entire subject of biological weapons disar- 
mament be reopened. The United States, together with 
other nations, should seek an agreement under which all 
governments would renounce research into agents of 
pestilence except for peaceful purposes, with all ap- 
propriate research to be conducted in internationally 
registered laboratories, open to scientists of all nations. 
National and international procedures should be de- 
veloped for broadly-based review of the social and scien- 
tific implications of proposals to produce novel, poten- 
tially harmful agents. Provisions should be included for in- 
ternational inspection and investigation of suspected 
violations. 
This much should be possible. One window upon Apoc- 
alypse is more than enough. □ 
1. "Biological research (1)," New Scientist (Oct. IS, 1973), p. 236. 
2. David Baltimore, draft transcript of news conference, National 
Academy of Sciences (July 18, 1974), MIT Institute Archives. 
3. Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, 29 (April 
1976), p. 1. 
4. Report of the Working Party on the Experimental Manipulation of 
the Genetic Composition of Micro-organisms, Cmnd. No. 5880 (1975), 
p. 9. 
5. M. Rogers, Biohazard (1977), p. 52. 
6. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction, United States Treaties, 26, part 1 (1975), 583-592; 
T.I.A.S. No. 8062, hereafter cited as BW Convention. 
7. See, for example, James L. Malone to David Baltimore, July 3, 
1975, document no. 1067, Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, 
National Institutes of Health; Robert Mikulak to Joseph Pcrpich, Dec. 
10, 1976, Recombinant DNA Research (U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, NIH 78-1139), 2 (March 1978), p. 486. 
8. 721k Plenary Meeting of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament, Aug. 17, 1976; reprinted in Recombinant DNA Research 
(March 1978), p. 492. 
9. Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of 
the Panics to the U.N. Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop- 
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Tox- 
in Weapons and on Their Destruction (Feb. 8, 1980, U.N. Document 
BWC/CONF.I/5). 
10. United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 5 (1980), p. 264. 
11. Minutes, Fcdcrjl Interagency Committee of Recombinant DNA 
Research, Nov. 23, 1976, in Recombinant DNA Research, 2 (March 
1978), p. 241; N. Wade. "BW and Recombinant DNA," Science, 208 
(April 18, 1980), p. 271. 
12. Department of Defense, “Annual Report on Chemical Warfare and 
Biological Research Programs," Congressional Record (Aug. 5, 1980), 
p. S10865. The only mention here of recombinant DNA and other genetic 
manipulation techniques relates to a theoretical analysis of U.S. 
vulnerability to a biological attack involving genetic engineering. 
13. Federal Register 48, No. 6 (Jan. 10, 1983), pp. 1,156-58. At the 
same rime, the National Institutes of Health also approved a proposal by 
the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences to introduce the 
E.coli Shiga-like toxin gene into E.coli. Both experiments were to be con- 
ducted in high containment facilities. At this writing, neither has been 
initiated. 
14. National InKitutes of Health Recombinant DNA Advisory Com- 
mittee, transcript of meeting, (Oct. 25, 1982), p. 149. 
15. Dr. John R. Murphy, statement. Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee transcript, pp. 157-62. 
16. Richard A. Finkelstein, Department of Microbiology, School of 
Medicine, University of Missouri-Columbia, to William Gartland, NIH 
Office of Recombinant DNA Activities, Sept. 27, 1982; a similar position 
has been taken by Dr. Michael Gill, professor of Molecular Biology and 
Microbiology, Tufts University and consultant on toxin experiments to 
the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. 
17. National Science Foundation figures. 
18. See Department of Defense Annual Report on Chemical Warfare 
and Biological Defense Research Programs for fiscal 1977, 1978, 1979, 
Congressional Record, March 1978, pp. S4025 ff. ; July 19, 1979, 
pp. S9921 ff.; Aug. 5, 1980, S10851 ff. 
19. Dr. William Beisel, in transcript, meeting of the National Institutes 
of Health Recombinant .DNA Advisory Committee (June 28, 1982), 
p. 44. Interview with Beisel, Feb. 3, 1983. According to Dr. Beisel, all 
work on medical defense sponsored by the U.S. Army Medical Research 
Institute of Infectious Diseases is unclassified; some results of work in the 
Defense Department Biological Detection and Protection Program, spon- 
sored by the Army Materiel Command, are classified. 
20. Defense Department: Annual Report on Chemical Warfare and 
Biological Research Programs, FY 1980 (Dec. 15, 1980), sec. 2, p. 4; An- 
nual Report on Chemical Warfare and Biological Research Programs, FY 
1981 (Dec. 30, 1981), sec. 2, p. 16. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Frank B. Armstrong, A. Paul Adams, William H. Rose, “Recombi 
nant DNA and the Biological Warfare Threat," unclassified version of: 
classified report commissioned by U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground 
TECOM No. 8-CO-513-FBT-021 (May 1981). 
23. Stephen Budiansky, “U.S. looks to biological weapons; militar 
takes new interest in DNA devices," Nature, 297 (June 24, 1982), 
p. 615. 
24. Alvin Lazen, executive director of NAS Commission on Life 
Sciences, interview (Feb. 7, 1983). 
25. James L. George to Dr. William J. Gartland, Jr., June 8, 1982; 
document no. 1075, NIH Office of Recombinant DNA Activities. 
26. United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 3 (1978), p. 327. 
27. For accounts of the negotiating history of the Convention, see 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of 
Chemical and Biological Warfare, IV: CB Disarmament Negotiations 
(Stockholm: Almquist and Wikscll, 1971), pp. 253-311; Background 
Paper, Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Pro- 
hibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
(Feb. 20, 1980), U.N. Document BWC/CONF 1/4. 
28. Quoted in letter from James L. George, emphasis added. 
29. Henry Kissinger, National Security Decision Memorandum 35 
(Nov. 25, 1969), in U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Government- 
al Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Hearings, 94th Con- 
gress, 1st Session (Sept. 16, 17, 18, 1975), I, p. 208. 
30. Transcript, meeting of the National Institutes of Health Recombi- 
nant DNA Advisory Committee (June 28, 1982),’p.~T6! 
31. Michael B. Callaham and Kosta Tsipis, “Biological Warfare and 
Recombinant DNA," Bulletin (Nov. 1978), p. 50. 
32. Congressional Research Service. “Chemical and Biological War- 
fare: Selected Issues and Developments during 1978 and January 1-June 
30, 1979," Report No. 79-156 SR (1979); see also British Biological 
Weapons Act, 1974. 
33. United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 5 (1980), pp. 263 - 64 . 
34. Resolution on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, 
U.N. General Assembly, 37th session, Nov. 18, 1982. (U.N. document 
A/C. I /37/1..6I ). The resolution was passed by a vote of 100 to 15; 
35. Robert I.. Bartley and William P. Kucewicz, “ ‘Yellow rain' and the 
future of Arms Agreements," Foreign Affairs, 61 (Spring 1983), 
pp. 817-20. 
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