December 10, 1963 
The Nation. 
Attachment II - Page 15 
399 
Cloning the acetylcholinesterase gene would be the first 
ttep toward developing a reliable Antidote to nerve gases. 
Such an antidote could be considered defensive in purpose, 
[ but it would also eliminate the main inhibition to the use of 
serve gas in warfare: the fear of retaliation. 
Of possibly greater immediate danger are the substances 
efessiGcd as toxins. Vastly more potent than nerve gases. 
At* poisons, such as the micotoxins derived from fbngi 
and detected in “yellow rain,” are also banned by the 1972 
B.W. treaty. The treaty defines toxins as inert substances 
created by “living organisms”; advances in recombinant 
DNA technology, however, have rendered that definition 
ambiguous because it is now possible to synthesize toxins. 
Cells containing the enzymes essential to produce the toxins 
can be cloned within a prolific bacterial strain. The cells can 
then be broken open and the enzymes extracted, using a bio- 
chemical purification process. The raw materials from 
which toxins derive can then be placed in a test tube with the 
enzymes, which will act on them, allowing the creation of 
taxhn without a living organism. 
Toxins might also be created in the laboratory using new 
chemical building-block techniques. Substances are "built” 
by taking the appropriate amino acids — the substances 
which form all proteins — and attaching them in the proper 
•equence. Although toxins are made up of highly complex 
molecules, their synthesis may soon become possible. 
An unclassified portion of a 1981 report prepared by 
scientists at the Army’s Dugway Proving Ground, a site in 
the Utah desert where much C.B.W. research and testing 
have been conducted, states, “A more feasible use of DNA 
than the creation of new pathogens is the cheap manufac- 
ture of toxins. This is because toxins could probably be 
uuuiufactured by newly created bacterial strains under con- 
trolled laboratory conditions.” 
Thus, not only are synthetic toxins not covered by the 
treaty, they are cheap— a virtue that should appeal to 
military men as maximally cost effective. 
related recombinant DNA research. Findings were' to be 
kept in an open file. In response to my requests for informa- 
tion on all current projects, Beisel provided two supposedly 
complete lists, one in February of this year and the other In 
September. On the first list there were sixteen projects and 
on the second there were thirty-seven. 
Drawing on a variety of other sources and on material ob- 
tained under the Freedom of Information Act, I discovered 
that Beisel’s first list was grossly incomplete. The second 
was better, but it still omitted at least six studies. Such omis- 
sions violate stated D.O.D. policy. Among the studies not 
included in Beisel’s lists is one on manipulation of 
diphtherial toxin con du cted by the U ni fonnedJSecxic.^ 
University . Moreover, none of the advanced biotechnology 
worTTbeing done by the Navy — including more than a dozen 
gene-splicing studies and numerous hybridoma studies — 
appears in the Navy’s annual C.B.W. reports, an apparent 
violation of Federal law. 
There arc two possible and equally frightening explana- 
tions for these discrepancies: The D.O.D. has a serious 
bureaucratic problem (it defines C.B.W. work unclearly or 
it has lost administrative control over these technologies). 
Or the D.O.D. deliberately attempted to cover up the range, 
depth or intent of the experiments. 
The Soviet Bugaboo 
Perhaps the most telling reason to suspect a cover-up is 
that the D ; O.D. fears the Soviet Union is conducting similar 
C.B.W. research. Documents I have obtained under the 
Freedom of Information Act reveal that, correctly or not, 
the United States believes the Russians are making a major 
effort to utilize genetic engineering techniques in developing 
biological warfare agents. 
NodUag to Hide 
Defense officials frequently point to the unclassified 
{ nature of B.W. research, including work with recombinant 
| DNA, as evidence that it does not violate the 1972 B.W. 
' treaty. Many leading scientists accept that rationale. Yet in a 
recent interview. Col. Robert Orton, chief of the Army’s 
Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Defense Division, drew a 
distinction between a generalized program, such as vaccine 
: development, and a “specific vulnerability.” As for the 
former, he said, “We don’t classify any of that. It’s when 
you get into something that might identify a specific 
vulnerability of a member of the U.S. forces or of the U.S. 
forces in larger scale, to something a potential enemy might 
use, then we would classify it.” Translated from Army 
jargon: Any militarily useful advance will be kept secret. 
In 1981, the Department of Defense made an effort to 
■Hay the public's fears about the potential dangers of gene- 
splicing. It designated the office of Dr. William R. Beisel, 
deputy for science at the Army’s Infectious Disease In- 
stitute, as the official repository of reports on all miiitary- 
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