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Attachment II - Page 16 
Tlx* Nut ion. 
December 10, 193J 
A 1979 report prepared by the Army’s Foreign Science 
Mid Technology Center, for example, cites statements by a 
Soviet imigri named Mark Popovskiy in support of that 
belief. According to the heavily censored document: 
Some may doubt the truth of Popovjkiy's statements, but all 
are supported, to a remarkable degree, by Information from 
other sources. ... His remarks on (Soviet Academy of 
Sciences Vice President Yu. A.) Ovchinnikov’s role in 
pushing GE (genetic engineering] techniques for the develop- 
ment of BW agents are backed by [censored] and possibly by 
the unusually large orders for biocontained ultracentrifuges, 
etc. There Is not a single statement made by Popovskiy that 
can not be corroborated by some other source. 
The report continues: "There may also be doubts about the 
efficacy of recombinant DNA techniques for producing 
tore effective pathogenic organisms for BW use [six lines 
ensored]. It would have been hard to predict 10 years ago 
the startling results achieved to date by these techniques." 
Given the U.S. military’s desire to achieve superiority 
over the Soviet Union in every area of military prepared- 
ness, the prospect of the enemy’s taking the lead could have 
injected new urgency into the biotechnology program. It 
may not be coincidental that the D.O.D. first publicly 
acknowledged its B.W. defense gene-splicing program 
shortly after the Army’s report on Soviet work was prepared. 
A Porous Treaty 
The primary impetus behind the D.O.D.’s description of 
its gene-splicing research as defensive in nature is the 1972 
B.W. convention. Most nations of the world, including all the 
major powers, are parties to the treaty, which is generally 
presumed to bar the development of offensive biological 
agents. But this treaty is riddled with loopholes, one of 
which Is the ambiguous definition of "toxin," mentioned 
earlier. 
The treaty permits signatories to maintain agents for 
"prophylactic" or "protective" purposes, but leaves to 
each nation the task of deciding how large a stockpile it 
needs. As the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s 
spokesman wrote in a letter to the National Institutes of 
Health's Office of Recombinant DNA Activities (ORD A), 
which oversees all gene-splicing research in America, 
"Laboratory, quantities of certain (B.W.] agents and toxins 
might well be required for research and testing.” He was 
careful to point out that these substances are not intended 
for "defensive warfare, retaliation or deterrence.” 
Nonetheless, according to Harvard^ Dr. Goldstein. 
minu te amounts are suitable for sabotage^ so existing Mocks 
could be considered a deterrent. When my F.O.l.A request 
for information on the quantities of B.W. agents held at 
Fort Dc trick , Mary land, was rejcctcd. Army spo kesm an 
Lawrence Wa re explained that terrorists might be enticed to 
s teal the samples i f thaljjata w a s_ mad cj u h 1 i c . I found that 
raiionaleuneotnineing, given the extreme virulence o! many 
B.W. agents. Since in some cases as few as ten bacteria can 
cause an infection and a single drop of virus may contain 
a trillion live organisms, terrorists could achieve their 
purposes with almost any quantity they found, should they 
choose to raid a heavily guarded Army lab in the first place. 
While "development" of biological and toxin weapons Is 
prohibited by the treaty, "research" on such weapons is 
not. The terms are not defined, so the signatory nations 
define them for themselves. The Reagan Administration in- 
terprets "research" to exclude work on new offensive 
agents. What’s more, the treaty does not prohibit nations 
from exporting the results of their research to nonsignatory 
nations for actual development. The Soviet Union has been 
accused of providing Vietnam with the know-how for its 
alleged "yellow rain" attacks. 
The convention contains no mechanism for verifying 
compliance, and there are no U.S. laws prohibiting the 
development of new or "improved" weapons by industry or 
academia. Historically, major C.B.W. developments, in- 
cluding nerve and mustard gases, have been the direct result 
of research from those quarters. The D.O.D. currently has 
two biotechnology contracts with private companies, and 
more are expected to be awarded. 
At least some of the gene-splicing research projects I have 
described, if carried to the development stage, would con- 
stitute violations of the 1972 treaty. If detected, they would 
cause widespread protests in this country and abroad, and 
throw into question the United States’ adherence to any 
future treaty. The result would be a severe blow to the pros- 
pect of banning biological warfare, and to arms control in 
general. But treaties can be violated secretly, or evaded by 
the export of B.W. technology to nonsignatory nations^ 
Eyen when B.W. use is suspected, such as the "yellow 
rain" case, noncompliance is difficult to prove. That is 
because of the unique nature of most B.W. agents, which 
break down or dissipate into the environment after use and 
are often indistinguishable from indigenous microorganisms 
or toxins. Of course, if the Pentagon could prove con- 
clusively that the Russians were using recombinant DNA or 
other biotechnologies to develop offensive B.W. agents, the 
Administration could justify an all-out race to "catch 
up’’— as it has done with nerve gas. 
In any case, nations have often violated or seriously con- 
sidered violating C.B.W. treaties when they have what they 
deem compelling reasons. In 1944, Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill came dose to drenching Germany in poison gas. 
In 1936, in direct violation of a Geneva protocol pro- 
hibiting chemical and biological warfare, the Italians used 
mustard gas during their invasion of Ethiopia. The gas was 
extremely effective against the primitively equipped and 
trained Ethiopians (there were 15,000 casualties-), and 
new methods of disseminating the gas. unavailable when 
Italy ratified the Geneva accord in 1928, provided an 
added incentive. 
Similarly, the application of gene-splicing and hybridoma 
technologies to this kind of warfare did not become known 
until sears alter the 1972 treaty was signed. According to 
SIPRI’s 1973 analysis, "If such !990s-type biological 
weapons already existed in 1972, the BW convention would 
Mtrcly not have been signed then; and just as there might 
have been strong military pressure in 1972 against accepting 
biological disarmament under such circumstances, so may 
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