- 2 - 
2. Although it was relevant to focus primarily upon the 
enfeebled E!. col i in the past, more and more work is underway 
or being planned on spore-forming and free-living micro- 
organisms. Some genera now being investigated include species 
that are known human, animal and plant pathogens. Therefore, 
studies should investigate the chance of survival of engineered 
organisms and the likelihood of their genetic exchange with 
other life forms. 
3. An understanding is needed of the possible infectivity, 
pathogenicity and toxicity of microbes in non-target species. 
4. Competition and possible perturbations of ecosystems 
by genetically engineered organisms of ecosystems should also 
be examined. 
5. Methods to monitor for the presence of microbes in 
various environmental media and organisms should be developed, 
6. Biological techniques to limit the spread of microbes 
in the environment need investigation. 
We recognize that some of these remaining research questions 
listed above fall within the realm of EPA, but a number of them 
certainly overlap the missions of the NIH. Still others are 
relevant to the expanded Department of Health and Human Services 
and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy and Interior. Because 
of the interrelationships among agencies, we think there would be 
merit in broadening the scope of the risk assessment work and to 
make it into a more collaborative venture. 
The EPA is charged by Congress to protect public health and 
our environment through a number of different statutes. We are 
concerned with contamination of water, drinking water and air, 
with solid waste and waste sites, and with pesticides and toxic 
substances. There is an impression that some of the commercial 
activities in the recombinant DNA field are being developed 
without the benefit of criteria for judging general population 
and environmental safety of the cellular products and especially 
the life forms themselves. We at EPA are charged with developing 
responsible public policy. Currently, it would seem prudent to 
investigate "potential" hazards associated with recombinant 
[613] 
