12 
Furthermore, they fully expect approval of their products to be 
tied to compliance with the Guidelines. 
The realities of tort law also operate to help ensure 
voluntary compliance. If a genetic engineering company failed 
to follow the Guidelines and caused any injury, it would be 
subject to liability for negligence; courts would find the 
company culpable after accepting that the Guidelines state the 
required standard of care. 14/ Indeed, two recent cases sug- 
gest that companies not only will comply themselves but also 
will monitor other companies within the industry. _15/ In those 
cases, the court ruled that when a defendant manufacture had a 
substantial market share, and nobody could prove which of 
several manufacturers actually caused the damage, the court 
could apportion liability among the defendants on the basis of 
each company's market share. 167 This approach is currently 
14/ See Karney , Regulation of Genetic Engineering: Less 
Concern About Frankenstein but Time for Action on 
Commercial Production, 12 U. Tol. L. Rev. 815, 853-55 
(1981) . 
15/ See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 
P . 2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., Civ. No. 64712 (Mich. Sup. Ct . Feb. 6, 1984). This 
approach is referred to as enterprise liability. 
16/ Although that case involved manufacturers of DES, the 
courts would likely extend the theory to genetic engi- 
neering . 
[ 712 ] 
