EDMUND MONTGOMERY—ARE WE CONSCIOUS AUTOMATA? 
75 
This desperate salto m or tale, this unqualified flopping round to the 
diametrically opposed idealistic side, when their scientific thought had 
to halt, baffled by the central enigma, seems to me a lame subterfuge, 
which I, for one, refuse to have recourse to. 
There can he no doubt that, by following the idealistic beut of the 
dilemma, surprisingly luminous conclusions are readied. After Locke 
had elaborated the sensorial side of Descarte’s mental philosophy, col¬ 
ors, sounds, odors and tastes were recognized to be purely individual 
sensations, and, therefore, phenomena of consciousness, instead of prop¬ 
erties of externa] things. After Berkeley had furthermore enlarged the 
domain of consciousness by despoiling physical nature of all perceived 
qualities whatever, proving that everything which is realized as percep¬ 
tion is of necessity a mental phenomenon, and by no means a physical 
existent, this at first astounding conclusion has since been considered 
flawless. And after Kant had finally demonstrated that time and 
space, as consciously realized bv us, are likewise mental phenomena, a 
royal road was opened for idealistic revelling. For, after such complete 
draining into the sphere of consciousness of everything which seemed 
to make up physical nature, it became doubtful to philosophically trained 
minds whether there exists, in truth, anything in the world save con¬ 
sciousness itself. To perceive is to be, so enunciated the Berkelians. 
Thought and Being are identical, so proclaimed the Transcendental 
Idealists. 
It would take vastly more time than is here at my disposal to enter 
into a detailed discussion of this weighty question. This I have at¬ 
tempted on former occasions. I will now directly appeal to this audi¬ 
ence to corroborate mv principal contention against pure idealism. This 
consists in the simple assertion that to you all I am a visible, audible, 
palpable presence; that you all perceive what is called my body, together 
with its sundry sense-affecting activities. 
However idealistically inclined anyone among you may be, I hardly 
think he will venture to deny the truth of this simple assertion. 
Now, it is just as true and certain that my mental states, my sensa¬ 
tions, perceptions, emotions, thoughts and volitions are, as such, alto¬ 
gether imperceptible to you, that they have no power whatever to affect 
your senses. If you were to look into every nook and crevice of my 
brain, or I into yours, no inkling of anything of mental consistency could 
be detected there—nothing but molecular commotion, no trace of any 
conscious state. 
It is quite clear and incontestable, then, that what you perceive as my 
body must be something of a nature entirely differing from my con¬ 
sciousness, from my feelings and thoughts, which you can not perceive, 
