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from the upper and the lower loopholes. Here and there angles of the 
stockade were guarded by specially strong bastions, and in most places there 
was a kind of moat below the glacis of the stockade. At intervals small gate¬ 
ways had been made, their doors being of heavy hewn planks and the passages 
through the doorway into the town most intricate. It was an admirable 
stockade for the purpose as shells had no effect on it, merely making a round 
hole as they passed through, the resistance being too weak to cause any breach 
to be made by an exploding shell. Mlozi’s weakness lay, however, in his not 
having built his stockade alongside the water from which he was separated 
by nearly a quarter of a mile. We had cut him off from his water supply, and 
although rain fell in abundance the water obtained was not sufficient for the 
enormous number of people cooped up in the stockade, and the cattle. More¬ 
over within the stockade the houses were closely packed with inflammable grass 
roofs, and these were soon set on fire by incendiary shells. Naturally many 
of the people took shelter in pits below the ground ; still the bombardment 
caused great loss of life. A sortie en force was made on the night of the 
2nd of December, but was smartly repelled by Commander Cullen with his 
Nordenfelt gun. 
At seven o’clock in the morning of the following day just as we had resumed 
our artillery fire, Mlozi hoisted a flag of truce. We ceased firing and I walked 
up to within a short distance of the walls to meet Mlozi who had come out 
of the main gateway. I was going to meet him face to face, but that one 
of the black sailors of the gunboats, a native of Zanzibar, warned me that 
he had overheard the Arabs advising Mlozi to stab me as soon as I came from 
under the guns of the fort and then to retreat through the open gateway. This 
may or may not have been Mlozi’s intention. At any rate I deemed it prudent 
to halt him at about eight yards distance, and from this point I spoke to him. 
He asked what would be our terms of peace and I replied “the immediate 
surrender of himself and all the other Arabs and of their fighting men, and the 
giving up of their guns and the release of all slaves held in the fort.” If he 
would fulfil these conditions I promised the Arabs and all their men their lives, 
but declined to commit myself to any other promises until I had investigated 
the whole case. Mlozi after some hesitation said that he would return and 
consult Kopakopa. Meantime two of his leading men were given to us as 
hostages, so that we might approach nearer to the fort and converse with the 
Arabs. Presently, however, an Arab—it may have been Mlozi—came out 
of the gateway and shouted to us that they would go on fighting; if we wanted 
them we must come and take them. We therefore released the hostages and 
allowed them to return, but before the flag of truce could be taken down Mlozi 
had opened fire on Lieut. Alston and on my camp. Fortunately the bullets 
passed through Lieut. Alston's helmet and left him uninjured, while I had just 
entered a hut and so escaped the fire directed at me. 
I hesitated to sanction an immediate assault on the stockade as it appeared 
likely to result in a terrible loss of life to our men. I therefore decided it was 
best that we should continue the bombardment and protract the war, so as 
to cause Mlozi to use up much of his ammunition before we finally assaulted 
the stockade. But matters were precipitated by the excellence of our artillery 
fire. A refugee Mhenga chief, who had escaped from the stockade during the 
truce, pointed out to us the exact situation of Mlozi’s house, the roof of which 
rose somewhat above the other buildings. Commander Cullen sighted a 
9-pounder gun very carefully, and Sergeant-Major Devoy landed three shells 
