148 Proceedings of the Pioyal Society 
the Professor of Moral Philosophy, gave forth when he took posses- 
sion of his chair in November 1868, and which he published under 
the title of “Moral Philosophy as a Science and a Discipline/’ 
In this essay he specially criticised the physiological method, and 
in such a way that the Professor of Physiology thought it ex¬ 
pedient to publicly controvert his views. The facts I have to place 
before the Society having a reference to this criticism, I quote it. 
Professor Calderwood said, “ There are evidences of great activity 
on the part of upholders of a sensational philosophy, differing only 
in its modifications from that wdiich Scotland formerly rejected 
under the leadership of Keid and Stewart. In conjunction with 
this revival of sensationalism, there is eagerness not only to com¬ 
bine physiological and mental science, but even to question the 
sufficiency of our investigations regarding the facts of consciousness 
—to make nerves and muscles the only safe approach to a science 
of mind,—and to proclaim the necessity of making physiology the 
basis of psychology. The consequence of this is, not only that 
mental philosophy is being encumbered with irrelevant investiga¬ 
tions concerning such physical processes as mastication and respira¬ 
tion, and such physical experiences as toothache and cramp in the 
stomach, hut we are involved in all the hazard connected with the 
use of a false method.” I gather from this sentence that my 
reverend colleague, however opposed or misinformed he may be 
as to the physiological method, certainly means not only to defend 
and resolutely maintain the sufficiency of the reflective method as 
laid down by his great master, but to assert its superiority over the 
Aristotelian method of observation and research. Now, it is upon 
these points that I join issue with him. I shall select two prob¬ 
lems for illustration, taken from my respected colleague’s own de¬ 
partment, viz., the nature of belief and of personal identity, being 
guided to the selection by his own declaration, viz., “ The supposi¬ 
tion that physiology can lead us to philosophy of mind, is doomed 
to rejection by all to whom it is clear that our personality is not 
essentially connected with our body, which is only a temporary 
dwelling,” &c. In this condemnation of physiology is included 
the assertion of the psychological proposition that mind, considered 
as an energy or principle, is separable from life, and that it only 
occupies the living body as a temporary tenant. Now, the holders 
