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CHAPTER OF CRITICISM. 
the order of Nature, for it is saic4 “ Man possesses a principle denied to other 
animals.” But in making this exception he falls into two manifest absurdities. 
1st.—If this be a true interpretation of Nature, she is inconsistent with herself. 
We have already seen the immense variety which, as is universally allowed, 
Nature is capable of producing without the introduction of any new principle. 
From the lowest Cryptogamic plant to the Oak, what an immense distance, what 
apparent contrariety! but no new principle. From the Oak to the highest 
species of Mammalia (Man, for the present, excluded), what a distance, what 
apparent contrariety! but no new principle. If, then, Nature shows so great 
variety consistently with so great simplicity of plan; if she has reached almost 
her highest point without the introduction of any new principle, surely in the 
absence ot all confirmatory evidence, it is absurd to suppose that on the sudden, 
when her labours are almost complete, she should so totally change her plan as to 
require a new principle for the creation of rational beings. If a Cryptogamic 
plant and a quadruped can be formed on the same principle, surely so also can 
the latter and Man be. 
2nd.—In making this exception, Mr. Lankesteu is inconsistent with himself. 
He himself expressly asserts that the progress from the lowest unreasoning 
animal to the highest is by gradual development, not by the introduction of a 
new principle; he must, therefore, be willing to own that the vegetable passes 
into the animal kingdom by the same almost imperceptible steps, and that 
animals possess no principle denied to plants; otherwise the distinction would be 
clearly marked; that is, we could immediately point out where the vegetable 
kingdom ended and the animal kingdom began. But notwithstanding this, he 
would doubtless deem it highly absurd to place plants and animals in the same 
division. Now, according to him, therefore, there is a greater difference between 
the highest quadruped and Man (on account of the superadded principle) than 
there is between the former and the lowest plant (the same principle being here 
in common); and yet, wonderful to say, he places Man at the head of a division 
of those very animals from, which, according to his own assertion, Man is 
separated by so wide a gulph *—“ that division of animals at which Man stands 
at the head.” (p. 138). What system of classification is this, in which opposites 
are brought together, and comparatively similar things separated ? 
It is now necessary to inquire what this principle is, which is possessed by Man 
and denied to other animals. Let us see. This principle, we are told, cc connects 
Man with all that is below him in creation, and with all that is divine and 
spiritual beyond the bonds of matter.” Softly, my good Sir! we have here a 
very comprehensive principle indeed; but it will be worth our while to inquire 
whether there be not more sound than sense in this grand sentence. “ Connects 
Man with all that is below him in creation;” there is great ambiguity in this clause. 
