4 
BEE-KEEPING NOT A NUISANCE. 
invests them with no such quia timet 
jurisdiction. 
Because bees may sting or annoy, 
therefore we prohibit. It would fol¬ 
low, that because cows may gore, dogs 
annoy the sensitive by barking or bit¬ 
ing, or running mad, we will also pro¬ 
hibit them. Because vehicles may 
annoy, by raising dust, or making'a 
noise, or animals may run away in 
harness, therefore we prohibit them. 
No such autocratic or despotic power 
is necessary to preserve the citizen 
from real harm and annoyance; and 
the Legislature could not prohibit the 
keeping of bees, and could not dele¬ 
gate such power under the Bill of 
Bights. For the right to acquire, 
possess, and protect property is 
secured by Section 2, Article 2, of the 
Constitution, beyond Legislative and 
municipal control: and bees are the 
subject of property. Nor can the citi¬ 
zen be destroyed or deprived of his 
life, liberty or property, except by the 
judgment of his peers, and the law of 
the land. 
ih. Section 21. Nor shall property 
betaken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation, ib. Sec¬ 
tion 22. This property-right is also 
protected by the 14th Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
Stockton laundry case. 26 Federal 
Rep. 611. The last cited is a case in 
point. The general law regulating 
governments of cities, does not give 
every town council, when, in their 
judgment, they fear that the keeping 
of certain kinds of property may 
annoy or injure, to declare it an 
annoyance and prohibit it. It must 
be a nuisance, per se, like a mill-pond 
or slaughter-house. Many things 
annoy, and may injure, that are not 
nuisances, and cannot be prohibited. 
Bell ringing, vehicle running, steam- 
whistles, and railroad trains are often 
annoying: so are privies and stables. 
This would not give power to prohibit 
them, to prevent quia timet —the possi¬ 
bility of annoyance or injury. The 
viciousness of this ordinance will be 
manifest, if we keep in view the dif¬ 
ference between I he power to regulate 
and keep possession of property, in 
due bounds, which power is conceded 
—and the power to prohibit keeping 
property altogether. 
These general clauses of the statute 
granting powers to towns are to he 
strictly construed, and this Court has 
repeatedly held ordinances void, which 
have been passed under a liberal con¬ 
struction of the general powers given 
The first is Waters vs. Leech, 3 Arkan¬ 
sas, 114. Thus the right to regulate 
and license keeping of a dram-shop 
does not authorize them to prohibit. 
Tuck vs. Waldron, 31 Arkansas, 462. 
Saloam S. Springs vs. Thompson, 41 
Arkansas, 456. Nor did the power to 
suppress gaming-houses empower a 
city to license them. State vs. Lind¬ 
sey, 34 A rkansas ; Goetler vs. State 
Use, etc., 45 Arkansas, 454— and the 
power given in the act did not give 
power to declare that which is not a 
nuisance per se, to be one—which was 
attempted. Little Rock vs. Ward, 41 
Arkansas, 527. Even the Legislature 
cannot, by declaration, make any¬ 
thing what it is not. 3 S. W. Rep. 
425. 12 Western Rep. 760. 11 Cen¬ 
tral Reporter, 21U. 
We may sum up this result: The 
power to regulate does not give the 
power to prohibit, though it does give 
power to license. Russellville vs. 
White, 41 Arkansas, 485; and that 
the power to prevent and abate nui¬ 
sance, does not give power to declare 
that a nuisance which is not perse 
such ; and no presumptions are 
indulged, in favor of the rightfulness 
of an ordinance. A City Council, 
with full power to declare a nuisance 
does so at its peril. Americus vs. 
Mitchell, 5 S. E. Reporter, 201. Per¬ 
sons abating a nuisance under a State 
law must show its existence. Newark 
& South Horse-Car Co. vs. Hunt, 11 
Central Reporter 219, 
In keeping with Hie decisions of our 
own court, to the effect that a City 
Council cannot by ordinance make 
that a nuisance which is not such ; 
see the following authorities : Horr 
& Bemiss, Mun. Pol. Ord. Sec. 252. 
24 M. J. Eq. 169. 
There is a recent case decided by 
the Supreme Court of Michigan, in 
which a city attempted by ordinance, 
under penalty of one hundred dollars, 
to punish and prohibit the distribu¬ 
tion of hand-bills and cards on any 
street or alley. The ordinance was 
held void, and that it was not a 
proper exercise of the power to clean 
streets, etc., and to prevent the 
incumbering of the same, and to regu¬ 
late the manner in which the streets 
should be used, and to prohibit and 
prevent the flying of kites, and all 
practices, amusements, and doings 
therein having a tendency to frighten 
teams or horses, as dangerous to life 
or property. This was held void in 
case of People vs. Armstrong, by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan, Jan. 18, 
1889, and is reported and commented 
on in the Albany Law Journal , March 
9, 1889, with approval. 
In that case there was much more 
pretense for the power than there is 
in this case; for bees are not named— 
