INAUGURAL ADDRESS. 
699 
his power of attention will be the success with which his 
labour is rewarded. All commencement is difficult, and this 
is more especially true of intellectual effort. When we turn 
our view for the first time to any given object, a hundred 
other things still retain possession of our thoughts. Even 
when we are able, by an arduous exertion, to break loose 
from the matters which have previously engrossed us, or 
which every moment force themselves on our considera¬ 
tion—even when a resolute determination, or the attraction 
of the new object, has smoothed the way on which we are to 
travel—still the mind is continually perplexed by the glimmer 
of intrusive and distracting thoughts, which prevent it from 
placing that which should exclusively occupy its view in the 
full clearness of an undivided light. How great soever may 
be the interest which we take in the new object, it will, how¬ 
ever, only be fully established as a favorite when it has been 
fused into an integral part of the system of our previous 
knowledge and of our established associations of thoughts. 
This can only be accomplished by time and custom. But if 
we are vigorous enough to pursue our course in spite of 
obstacles, every step, as we advance, will be found easier; the 
mind becomes more animated and energetic; the distractions 
gradually diminish ; the attention is more exclusively concen¬ 
trated upon its object; the kindred ideas flow with greater 
freedom and abundance, and afford an easier selection of 
what is suitable for illustration. At length our system of 
thought harmonises with our pursuit. The whole man be¬ 
comes, as it may be, philosopher or historian or poet. He lives 
only in the trains of thought relating to this character. He 
now energises freely and, consequently, with pleasure, for 
pleasure is the reflex of enforced and unimpeded energy. All 
that is produced in this state of mind bears the stamp of 
excellence and perfection/” 
Helvetius also justly observes that the very feeblest intellect 
is capable of comprehending the inference of one mathematical 
position from another, and even of making such an inference 
itself. Now, the most difficult and complicated demonstra¬ 
tions in the works of a Newton or a Laplace are all made 
up of such immediate inferences. They are like houses com¬ 
posed of single bricks. No greater exertion of intellect is 
required to make a thousand such inferences than is requisite 
to make one, as the effort of laying a single brick is the 
maximum of any individual effort in the construction of such 
a house. 
Thus, the difference between an ordinary mind and the mind 
of a Newton consists principally in this, that the one is capable 
