THE LAW OF WARRANTY. 
167 
dealer, not being convinced of the justice of the request, nor 
having any motive which renders it advisable to avoid giving 
his customer offence, declines to receive the animal. At this 
point we perceive the use, if any, of the warranty. Its provisions 
being definite, there would seem to be no doubt as to the result. 
The horse in dispute is sold by public auction, and an action 
brought for recovery of the difference. At the trial, the plaintiff’s 
witnesses, of course, swear “pro;” the defendant’s in stronger 
muster swear “ contra,” and the plaintiff, to his inexpressible 
astonishment, loses the cause. This is a type of constantly 
occurring cases, and serves to shew the extreme uncertainty of 
any legal proceedings in such matters. We might, however, 
fairly consider that professional evidence as to soundness would 
always be consistent; that however common witnesses might 
swear against each other, veterinary surgeons, in speaking of 
anatomical points or cases of disease, would as a rule be una¬ 
nimous; but the rule is just the other way. We know no 
evidence more conflicting than professional evidence: the cause 
of this must be either “ ignorance” or dishonesty. We are quite 
aware of many cases where differences of opinion are to be ex¬ 
pected, such as instances of obscure lameness, duration of a 
disease, or the probable effects of such disease; but what we 
complain of is the opposition and hard swearing in matters where 
no two opinions should be tolerated—in matters of fact. 
The way, it may be said, to remove much of this is to take 
the opinions of men known in the scientific world as being 
most likely to grapple successfully with obscure questions. In 
our innocence we once thought so too; but we have lived to see 
the delusion dispelled: science in a court of justice is a nonentity. 
To perpetrate a witticism on the name may be compatible with 
the dignity of a judge. The evidence of the village farrier, 
who is “celebrated for diseases of bone,” is held equal to that 
of the scientific man. “ Experience” is the talisman : let the 
witness be a practical man, and he may talk of “ thickening of 
the integuments between the skin and the bone ,” or any other 
nonsense of an equally choice character, with impunity. The 
judge and jury are not anatomical in their ideas; they cannot 
appreciate the ignorance displayed of the very alphabet of 
science; they are swayed by the experience and number of the 
witnesses, not by their attainments, because they cannot under¬ 
stand them. 
“My Lord and Gentleman of the Jury,” said a learned counsel, 
“I bring six professional men who swear the horse is sound; lam 
confident of your verdict;” but, replies the opposite counsel, 
“ My lord, I have ten respectable men who swear he is unsound. 
1 have no doubt of your decision being in my favour.” 
We have not sufficient assurance to imagine that we can 
