774 
VETERINARY JURISPRUDENCE. 
Witness. —Yes. 
Mr. Barirum. —A horse with a flat foot without a crust—that is a sound 
horse ? 
Witness. —Yes. 
Mr. Bartrum. —Is that a natural foot ? 
Witness. —Yes. You would find colts out at grass so. 
3Ir. Bartrum. —In a six-year-old horse would you find a sound horse 
possessing a flat foot with low heels and no crust ? 
Witness. —You might. If a horse was so when'young, he would be so 
when he got six years of age. 
Mr. Bartrum. —How long have you been in the profession ? 
Witness. —Nine years. 
Mr. Bartrum. —Admitted nine years ? 
Witness. —Yes. 
This being the case for the defendant, 
Mr. Bartrum replied, conmienting on the extraordinary hypothesis just 
propounded by Mr. Buckeridge, and remarking that if the human flesh 
were liable to all sorts of ills, he did not know what to say about the poor 
horse flesh, if it were so liable to be knocked up (laughter). He was sure 
the jury would place no reliance on such evidence, Mr, Bartrum then 
contrasted the evidence of Mr. Broad with that of Mr. Buckeridge, 
drawing attention to the fact that the former had seen the horse. This 
case would probably, through the medium of the press, get into the Vete¬ 
rinary Journal, and he expected they would find a good number of notes 
of admiration placed after Mr. Buckeridge’s evidence. Mr. Bartrum 
urged in conclusion that the plaintiff was not seeking to gain anything by 
this action; but that he was simply endeavouring to recover what he was 
actually out of pocket. 
His Honour summed up the case to the jury in a very lucid manner, 
drawing their attention to the fact that there had not been the slightest 
imputation cast on the character of either party. The defendant’s wife 
had given her evidence in an extremely creditable manner, and had any 
imputation been made there would have been nothing to justify it. 
Neither had there been the least imputation on the part of the defendant. 
The. learned gentleman who appeared for the defendant was quite in¬ 
capable of making any misrepresentation either of law or fact, but he 
(the learned judge) thought he was mistaken so far if he thought that the 
belief of the defendant could in any way affect the warranty which had 
been given. Admitting that the defendant’s wife fully believed at the 
time that the horse was sound, if a warranty were given to a plaintiff by 
a defendant or his agent, and the horse turned out to be unsound, clearly 
a plaintifi’ suing a defendant was entitled to damages. Of that there 
could not be the slightest doubt whatever, and this point he had been 
very anxious to clear up. The question for the jury to determine was, 
whether or not the horse was sound, and to give their verdict accoi'dingly. 
One other observation he had to make to them was, that the burden of 
proof was on the plaintiff, and it was for him to satisfy them by reasonable 
evidence that the horse was unsound at the time of the sale. Then with' 
respect to the damages, they might take the price given for the horse at 
the time by the plaintifi* to the defendant, as fair and strong (though not 
conclusive) evidence of what the horse would be as sound, viz., £30. If 
the jury considered the sale by auction to have been fairly conducted 
under reasonable circumstances, then they might take the price given as 
a reasonable test of the value of the horse as unsound. They had then 
to take into consideration such expenses as might reasonably be incurred 
by the sale, which only amounted to a few shillings. About the minor 
