378 
The Chdrvalca System of Philosophy. 
[No. 4, 
be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the 
major.* * * § Now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute 
of any condition, accepted or disputed ;f and this connection does not 
possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its existence, as 
the eye, &c. are the cause of perception, but by virtue of its being 
known. What then is the means of this connection’s being known ? 
We will first shew that it is not perception. Now perception is 
held to be of two kinds, external and internal, i. e. as produced by the 
external senses, or by the inner sense, mind. The former is not the 
required means ; for although it is possible that the actual contact of 
the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particu¬ 
lar object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such 
contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition £ 
which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and 
major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may 
you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the 
general class as its object, because, if so, there might arise a doubt as 
to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case,§ 
(as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying fire). 
Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot establish 
that the mind has any power to act independently towards an exter¬ 
nal object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses, 
as has been said by one of the logicians, “ The eye, &c., have their 
objects as described; but mind externally is dependent on the others.” 
Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal 
proposition, since in the case of this inference, we should also require 
another inference to establish it, and so on, and hence would arise the 
fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression. 
Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may either al¬ 
lege in reply, in accordance with the Vais'eshika doctrine of Kanada, 
that this is included in the topic of inference ; or else we may hold that 
this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier 
* Literally cc must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable attend¬ 
edness (vyapti.J ” 
f For the sandigdtia and nis'chita upaclhi see Siddhanta Muktavali, p. 125. 
The former is accepted only by one party. 
X Literally, the knowledge of the invariable attendedness (as of smoke by fire). 
§ The attributes of the class are not always found in every member, — thus 
idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particular smoke 
might be a sign of a fire in some other place. 
