3SG2.] 
379 
The Chdrvaka System of Philosophy . 
that stopped the progress of inference, since it depends itself on the 
recognition of a sign, in the form of the language used in the child’s 
presence by the old man and moreover there is no more reason for 
our believing on another’s word, that smoke and fire are invariably 
connected, than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu, &c., (which 
of course we Charvakas reject). 
And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only means 
of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in the case 
of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between 
the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another 
person, there could be no inference of one thing (as fire) on seeing 
another thing (as smoke) ; hence, on your own shewing, the whole 
topic of inference for oneselff would have to end in mere idle 
words. 
Then again comparison,% &c., must be utterly rejected as the means 
of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is impossible that 
they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection (i . e. 
the universal proposition), because their end is to produce the 
knowledge of quite another connection, viz., the relation of a name 
to something so named. 
Again, this same absence of a condition, § which has been given as 
the definition of an invariable connection (i. e. a universal proposi¬ 
tion ;) can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish 
that all conditions must be objections of perception, and therefore 
although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, 
the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible, 
and thus, since we must here too have recourse to inference, &c., we 
cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar 
them. Again, we must accept as the definition of the condition, “ it is 
that which is reciprocal or equipollent inextension|| with the majorterm, 
# g ee Sahitya Darpana (Dr. Ballantyne’s trans. p. 16) and Siddhanta M. p. 80. 
f The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument. 
+ “ Upamana or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the pro¬ 
duction of an inference from similarity. This particular inference consists in 
the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named,” Dr. Ballan¬ 
tyne’s Tarka Sangraha. . 
§ The upadhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general 
middle term as in the inference ‘ the mountain has smoke because it has lire,’ if 
we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term will be no longer too 
general. In the case of a true vyapti there is of course no upadhi. 
|| A 'vTicrrpecpei. We have here our own A with distributed predicate. 
3 D 
