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The Ch&rvaka System of Philosophy. [No. 
though not constantly accompanying the middle.” These three dis¬ 
tinguished clauses, “not constantly accompanying the middle term,” 
“ constantly accompanying the major term,” and “ being constantly ac¬ 
companied by it” ( i . e. reciprocal), are needed in the full definition 
to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions, in the argument 
to prove the non-eternity of sound, as ‘ being produced,’ ‘ the nature 
of a jar,’ and ‘the not causing audition v wherefore the definition 
holds,—and again it is established by the sfioka of the great Doctor 
beginning samdsama. f 
But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the 
knowledge of the condition’s absence, it is only when there is the 
knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality 
of the proposition is possibie, i. e. a knowledge in the form of such a 
connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished 
by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand the 
knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the in- 
* If we omitted the first clause and only made the upadhi “ that which 
constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it,” then 
in the Naiyayik argument * sound is non-eternal, because it lias the class of sound * 
‘ being produced’ would serve as a Mimansik upadhi, to establish the vyabhicliara 
fallacy, as it is reciprocal with ‘ non-eternalbut the omitted clause excludes it, 
as an Upadhi must be consistent with either party’s opinions, and of course the 
Naiyayik maintains that ‘ being produced’ always accompanies the class of sound. 
Similarly if we defined the upadhi as ‘ not constantly accompanying the middle 
term and constantly accompanied by the major,’ we might have as an upadhi ‘ the 
nature of a jar,’ as this is never found with the middle term (the class or na¬ 
ture of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in ajar,) while at the 
same time wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity. 
Lastly if w r e deGned the upadhi as “ not constantly accompanying the middle 
term, and constantly accompanying the major,” we might have as a Mimansik 
upadhi ‘the not causing audition’ i. e. the not being apprehended by the organs of 
hearing ; but this is excluded, as non-eternity is not always found where this is, 
ether being inaudible and yet eternal. 
t This refers to an obscure s'loka of Udayanacharya, “ where a reciprocal and 
a non-reciprocal universal-connection (£. e. universal propositions which severally 
do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the same argument (as e. y. 
to prove the existence of smoke,) there that non-reciprocating term of the second 
will be a fallacious middle, which is not invariably accompanied by the other re- 
procal of the first.” Thus ‘the mountain has smoke because it has fire’ (here fire 
and smoke are non-reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by 
smoke though smoke is by fire,) or ‘ because it has fire from wet fuel’ (smoke and 
fire from w T et fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other) ; the non- 
reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a fallacious inference, because it is 
also, of course, not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire, that‘produced 
from wet fuel. But this will not be the case, where the non-reciprocating term 
is thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal, as ‘ the mountain lias fire 
because it has smoke ;’ here though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet smoke 
will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by heat which is the 
reciprocal of fire. 
