288 
REPORT—1847. 
ventional arrangement; consequentlj’, every sound must originally baw 
been significative of something. The unity of sound fthe syllable, pare« 
consunantized) must therefore originally' have corresponded to a unity of k:' 
scious plastic thought; and every thought must have had a real or subsiMUi 
objprt of perception. The nuiui cannot conceive existence except in ti '- 
exiating ; and on the other hand, every distinct notion of a thing prwuppw 
its existence. Thus every object of perception appears necesaarily to i 
mind a thing placed under the category of qualitative existence, exbfcs 
being the necessary attribute of everything contemplated by tbf i- 
Now the noun is the expression of a thing itxisting. The substanu^c j 
is the existing thing, denominated according to that quality of tin* y; 
which strikes the mind, when reacting upon the impression reccing 
through the senses. Tiie noun-adjcctive in general is the quality^- 
existing thing, considered as separate from it. Or, we may say, * 
suggested to us by the nature of Chinese words, the suhstandveaa 
verb represent the two ojtpostte poles of the originally uniiivldtd no’^ 
the mljective is the iudifferentia] jwint between the two poles, ptw 
itself towards the nominal itole a.s an adjective, towards the verhd ss*.- 
ticiplc. But thn origimd substantial word must represent tlie unity ' 
diflerences, by being a substantive, or verb, or adjective, according tei ^ 
indicated by its tone and position in the senteDce. No substiinttve-uo^ 
originate without the working of that which is expressed by ?T' 
the specific quality or property of the thing contemplated. ^ 
fore is only a term for a mode of existence, that is to say, for a moii' 
of wliich the verb is the abstract exprassion. Every act of vw® • 
presupposes therefore the unity of tlicse three fundamental 
That 15 to say, every single word implies necessarily a complete 
consistiog of subject, predicate and copula- Such indeed we mun 
the case in Chinese. 
If thus the very beginning of speech is impossible 
power ol the mind reacting upon the inipressiitn of the sense®’ ' 
expre.s8ion of thought is entirely substantial. Nolh'^g but a | 
expressed, although no spbstance can ever be expressed witliou ^ 
power of the mind which stamps it. The action of the conteinplap''tj' 
itself, the copula, as it is called in logic, the affirmation or I 
conoectj* a subject and predicate, a noun and a verb, substantive « , i 
jective, will least of all have originally an abstract expression. “ 
negation ol a sentence (which sentence may be one word) w tno®* “ ^ 
expressed by a gesture, added to the expression of some 
nieut. Creslures and accents are the natural commentary upon ^ 
forming wonl. The same is the case with the relations of nouns 
to space and time, or to any quality or degree. The preposiiionf ; 
positions, the affixes and suffixes, the declensions and conjugatw'^ 
jaiiguagwi, arc, in primeval speech, expressed like the copula, bv^ 
by accent, declamation, pauses, gestures, finally by the accompany 
of the object. For language, in its primitive substantial state. 
completion and illustration the writing of the image 
later languages find a useful commentary in the orthography 
necessary one in the context of speech. How, for instance, *8“^ , 
English and mile, right, wright, tprile and rite, o'" u- 
or to, loo, tuy, unless an vinmistakeable synonym be added, or 
explaii, it directly? But before as after the invention of 
musical and the gesticular element are necessary accompanimea^ i^'r 
bsolute, unchangeable and unbending substantiality then ^ 
